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Copyright Infringement’s Blurred Lines: Allocating 
Overhead in the Disgorgement of Profits 
Layne S. Keele∗ 
In Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Marvin Gaye’s estate alleged that 
the popular song “Blurred Lines” infringed Gaye’s 1977 song “Got to 
Give It Up.” As part of the remedy for the infringement, the Gaye estate 
sought to disgorge the profits derived from defendants’ infringement, but 
the parties disagreed about how to calculate those profits. Specifically, they 
disagreed about whether the infringing song’s revenues should be offset by 
the infringers’ $7 million in overhead costs allocable to the song. The 
district court determined that the infringers’ ability to offset overhead 
costs would depend on whether their infringement was willful; it held that 
inadvertent infringers are entitled to offset overhead, while willful 
infringers are not. A few months later, however, in Oracle America, Inc. 
v. Google, Inc., a different district judge in the Ninth Circuit explicitly 
disagreed with the Williams court in reaching a different conclusion. 
As these examples illustrate, this issue—whether to reduce 
disgorgement awards to account for overhead costs in copyright 
infringement cases—has vexed courts. Some courts, such as the Second 
Circuit, have held that infringement-related overhead should always be 
factored in to reduce disgorged profits. Other courts, such as the Seventh 
Circuit, have held that overhead should never be factored in. Still others 
have held that it should be factored in only if the defendant’s 
infringement was willful.  
In this Article, I argue that all of these holdings are wrong. 
Specifically, I argue that overhead should reduce the defendant’s profit 
calculation only when the defendant can prove that, but for the 
infringement, it would have utilized the assets represented by the overhead 
in some other revenue-generating fashion. Although there may be a rough 
correlation between this analysis and an analysis of the defendant’s 
 
 ∗  Associate Professor of Law, Faulkner University’s Thomas Goode Jones School of 
Law. The author would like to thank retiring Dean Charles I. Nelson for his support, both of 
this Article and of the author personally. Dean Nelson will be missed at Faulkner University. In 
addition, the author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the industrious and talented 
editors at the Brigham Young University Law Review. 
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willfulness, the focus on willfulness emphasizes the wrong consideration, 
resulting in much of the confusion that permeates the current law.  
Part of this confusion stems from a disagreement regarding the 
purpose of the disgorgement remedy. Some argue that disgorgement is 
coercive, others that it is punitive, and still others that it is compelled by 
notions of corrective justice. I contend in this Article that corrective 
justice best accounts for the features of copyright disgorgement. I also 
argue that only by considering the defendant’s conduct through a non-
infringing counterfactual can we achieve disgorgement’s goal, as 
described in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., of a “rational 
separation of net profits so that neither party may have what rightfully 
belongs to the other.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 10, 2015, a California jury determined that the 
Grammy-nominated song “Blurred Lines,” by Robin Thicke, Pharrell 
Williams, and T.I., infringed the copyright in Marvin Gaye’s “Got to 
Give It Up.”1 Of the almost $7.4 million awarded in the jury verdict, 
$4 million was awarded as actual damages to compensate Gaye’s 
estate, while the remaining $3.4 million was awarded to disgorge (that 
is, to take away) the infringers’ profits.2 
The law of remedies usually looks to the plaintiff ’s rightful 
position in determining a monetary award,3 so the defendant-oriented 
framing of disgorgement (and of restitution more generally) is 
somewhat unusual in the law of remedies. Because of this unusual 
approach, disgorgement of a defendant’s profits is, at times, a 
controversial remedy.4 One such controversy relates to how to 
calculate those profits. In particular, courts disagree about whether to 
allocate overhead—those expenses not directly attributable to 
 
 1.  Ann Oldenburg, ‘Blurred Lines’ Jury Finds for Marvin Gaye, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 
2015, 3:04 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2015/03/10/blurred-lines-
trial-verdict/24492431/. 
 2.  Special Verdict at 2, Williams v. Bridgeport Music Inc., No. CV13–06004-JAK 
(AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015), ECF No. 320. 
 3.  See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 
535  (2016). 
 4.  See Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in Copyright, 48 EMORY L.J. 1, 29–
30, 35–40, 61–63 (1999) (criticizing generally disgorgement in copyright); Andrew Kull, 
Disgorgement for Breach, the “Restitution Interest,” and the Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 2021, 2022 (2001) (discussing disgorgement as a remedy for breach of contract). 
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particular products5—against the revenues of an infringing product in 
order to determine an infringer’s profits.6 
The allocation of overhead was a source of dispute between the 
parties in the “Blurred Lines” case,7 and the question has likewise 
divided federal courts.8 Some circuits permit an infringer’s profits to 
be reduced by a proportionate share of overhead expenses,9 while 
other circuits have held that overhead expenses cannot be used to 
offset revenues in calculating profits,10 at least for willful wrongdoers.11 
The decision of whether to allocate overhead can significantly impact 
the plaintiff ’s recovery.12 For example, in the “Blurred Lines” case, the 
allocation of overhead would have made a difference of about $7 
million.13 The district court ultimately concluded that overhead would 
 
 5.  Overhead, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 6.  See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 14.03[C][3] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2017) (“When infringement is deliberate, some courts 
appear to deny a deduction of overhead, but others are not convinced.”); Mark P. Gergen, 
Causation in Disgorgement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 827, 843 (2012). 
 7.  See Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 
4479500, at *26, *25 n.21 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015); Joint [Proposed] Jury Instructions at 
23–24, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. CV13-06004-JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 
2015), ECF No. 223. References to the docket of Williams v. Bridgeport Records are hereinafter 
cited as Blurred Lines Case, ECF No. —, at [Page(s)]. 
 8.  See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.03[C][3]. 
 9.  See, e.g., Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1999). Overhead and 
fixed costs are not identical, although they overlap. See Overhead, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014); see also Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 
1980) (“Expenses which are generally categorized as overhead, such as administrative salaries 
and utilities, have been broken down by the parties into fixed and variable expenses according 
to whether the incremental production of [the infringing work] actually affected the amount of 
the expense.”); Hamil Am., Inc. v. SGS Studio, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2513(JSM), 1998 WL 19991, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 
193 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Part of the difficulty of determining whether ‘overhead’ should 
be deducted arises from the fact that the term ‘overhead’ embraces a variety of expenses . . . .”). 
 10.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 11.  See, e.g., Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 12.  See, e.g., id. (refusal to allocate overhead resulted in award roughly fourteen times 
what the award would have been with overhead allocation). 
 13.  Eriq Gardner, ‘Blurred Lines’ Trial Reveals How Much Money Robin Thicke’s Song 
Made, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 3, 2015, 10:54 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com 
/thr-esq/blurred-lines-trial-reveals-how-778884 (describing the testimony of a Universal Music 
executive that overhead costs for the song were about $7 million). 
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not be allocated if the counter-defendants were found to have willfully 
infringed.14 But this decision represents only one possible approach.  
In this Article, I survey the circuits’ varied approaches to overhead 
allocation in copyright disgorgement. I also identify the potential 
purposes underlying the disgorgement remedy and, after evaluating 
each of those purposes, assess the propriety of overhead allocation 
under these various purposes. Next, I discuss the reasons for the 
disagreement surrounding the allocation of overhead. In the end, I 
contend that a proper determination of whether to allocate overhead 
should turn not on the defendant’s willfulness in infringement but 
instead on the defendant’s hypothetical activities in a counterfactual 
of non-infringement. 
II. VARIOUS APPROACHES 
The awarding of profits is a statutory remedy enacted in 1909,15 
although courts disgorged infringers’ profits in copyright 
infringement actions long before the statute was enacted.16 Copyright 
laws permit a copyright owner to recover not only actual damages 
(e.g., lost sales) but also “any profits of the infringer that are 
attributable to the infringement,” subject to a prohibition on a double 
recovery.17 The statute also specifies the burden-shifting approach that 
applies to a copyright disgorgement claim: “[T]he copyright owner is 
required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and 
the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses.”18 
This measure of recovery and burden-shifting approach stem from a 
traditional trust-accounting formula.19 
The statute does not define “deductible expenses,” leaving courts 
to sort through the infringer’s expenses to determine which are 
 
 14.  Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 
4479500, at *26 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015). 
 15.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). 
 16.  Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940). 
 17.  17 U.S.C. § 504. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. 
LAW. INST. 2011) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. 
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deductible and which are not.20 Some deductions are uncontroversial. 
For example, variable costs of the infringing products are deductible—
the revenues generated by an infringing book will be reduced by the 
costs of the paper, ink, and cover of each book sold.21 Other expenses 
are indisputably not deductible—the infringer cannot offset its 
revenues by costs wholly unconnected with the infringement.22 The 
disagreement surrounds whether to allow infringers to deduct 
overhead costs connected to the infringement. In Williams, for 
example, the defendants sought to set off overhead costs such as 
salaries and fringe benefits of studio personnel who worked on the 
song, as well as “rent, utilities, dues and subscriptions, trade industry 
dues, legal expenses and things of that nature.”23 The courts’ various 
positions with respect to the allocation of overhead—including the 
position taken by the court in Williams—are explored in the 
following  sections. 
A. Overhead Is Deductible  
Some courts allow infringers to deduct overhead from the 
calculation of profits to be disgorged, regardless of whether the 
infringement was willful. These courts reason that overhead that 
contributed to the manufacture or sale of the infringing product is as 
necessary to the infringement as any variable cost (which is always 
deductible), and that, consequently, this overhead should be deducted 
 
 20.  For cases in addition to the ones discussed in this Part, see Alois Valerian Gross, 
Annotation, Measure of Damages and Profits to Which Copyright Owner Is Entitled Under 17 
USCS § 504(b), 100 A.L.R. Fed. 258, § 54, at 387–97 (1990 & Supp. 2014). 
 21.  See, e.g., Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980); 
Lee Valley Tools, Ltd. v. Indus. Blade Co., 288 F.R.D. 254, 268 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (collecting 
cases, including copyright cases, for the proposition that infringers are “entitled to deduct the 
variable costs it incurs to manufacture or sell the infringing product so long as it can prove the 
costs were directly related to the infringing product”) (trademark case). 
 22.  Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring the infringer to 
demonstrate a nexus between the sales of infringing goods and the expense for which the 
deduction is sought); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P. C. v. Empire Const. Co., 542 F. Supp. 
252, 264 (D. Neb. 1982) (“The rule is that the overhead expenses which assist in the production 
of an infringing work are deductible from the gross profit of the infringer.”); George P. Roach, 
Restitution Rollout: The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment: Counter-
Restitution for Monetary Remedies in Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1298 (2011). 
 23.  Blurred Lines Case, supra note 7, ECF No. 351, at 59. 
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in calculating profits from the infringement.24 The Second Circuit 
takes this approach, as have some district courts in the Ninth Circuit.  
1. The Second Circuit 
In Hamil America v. GFI, the Second Circuit held that even 
conscious wrongdoers should be allowed to allocate overhead as 
expenses of the infringing product.25 The district court opined that 
the proper approach to overhead deduction was the “incremental 
approach,” which deducts only costs actually increased by the 
infringing production.26 The court was concerned that “willful 
infringers should not be permitted to subsidize the sale of legitimate 
goods with the sale of infringing goods ‘by passing part of its fixed 
cost on to the copyright holder.’”27 
The Second Circuit reversed,28 rejecting the district court’s 
reliance on the infringer’s willfulness to deny overhead allocation.29 
Rather than a “hard and fast rule denying all overhead deductions to 
willful infringers,” the Second Circuit held that willful infringers’ 
overhead allocation was subject to the same approach as other 
infringers.30 Specifically, it noted that its prior cases had permitted 
overhead to be allocated to the infringing product as long as it satisfied 
a two-step approach: first, the overhead must be sufficiently connected 
to the infringing product; and second, the allocation method must be 
reasonable.31 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit shared “the district 
court’s concern that willful infringers should not be permitted to 
subsidize the sale of legitimate goods with the sale of infringing goods 
 
 24.  See Hamil, 193 F.3d at 104. 
 25.  Id. at 96. 
 26.  Hamil Am., Inc. v. SGS Studio, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2513(JSM), 1998 WL 19991, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 
F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1999). The district court contrasted the “incremental approach” with the “full 
absorption” approach, which proportionately deducts all overhead expenses, including 
fixed  costs. 
 27.  Hamil, 193 F.3d at 106 (quoting Hamil, 1998 WL 19991, at *2). 
 28.  Id. at 108–09. 
 29.  Id. at 106–07. The earlier circuit precedent that the Second Circuit primarily relied 
on was Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, Corp., a case involving a movie that was made based 
on the plaintiff’s screen play. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp, 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 
1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
 30.  Id. at 106. 
 31.  Id. at 104–06. 
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by ‘passing . . . fixed cost on to the copyright holder.’”32 Accordingly, 
in an apparent effort to differentiate cases of conscious wrongdoing 
from inadvertent wrongdoing, the court held that the eval-
uation “must be applied with particular rigor in the case of 
willful  infringement.”33 
It is unclear exactly how the Second Circuit’s particular-rigor-for-
willful-infringement approach differs from the general application of 
the two-step approach.34 The court noted that all infringers bear the 
burden of establishing a sufficient nexus between the claimed 
overhead and the infringing product but stressed that, in cases of 
willful infringement, the district court “should give extra scrutiny” to 
the connection between the overhead and the infringing product.35 
The Second Circuit also noted that, in any disgorgement case, the 
district court “must determine that the particular allocation formula 
is optimal and sound” but that willful infringers “should be held to a 
particularly high standard of fairness” (whatever that means). The 
court concluded with an instruction that lower courts “should not 
hesitate to reject a formula which allows the willful infringer to deduct 
more of its overhead than was directly implicated in the manufacture 
of the infringing product.”36 In the end, the Second Circuit seems to 
have said that the district court should do its job in every case but that 
it should do its job particularly well in cases of willful infringement.37 
 
 32.  Id. at 106–07. 
 33.  Id. at 107. 
 34.  See George P. Roach, Counting the Beans: Unjust Enrichment and the Defendant’s 
Overhead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 483, 567 (2008) (“[I]t seems difficult to conceive that a 
court would structure the review of evidence on the basis on [sic] graduated levels of scrutiny.”). 
 35.  Hamil, 193 F.3d at 107. The court does not articulate how the “extra scrutiny” 
should manifest itself in the allowance of overhead, nor does the court articulate a different 
standard that the district court should apply. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  District courts in the Second Circuit have addressed the issue, both before and after 
Hamil America. In Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., the district court discussed the “incremental 
approach” (no allocation of overhead) with the “full absorption approach” (allocation of 
overhead), and concluded the Second Circuit precedent compelled the full absorption approach. 
Warner Bros., v. Gay Toys, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), Oddly, the Second 
Circuit seems less favorably disposed to the overhead of those who offer emergency medical 
treatment than to the overhead of willful copyright infringers. See Roach, supra note 22, at   
1296–97. 
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2. Ninth Circuit district courts 
In ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., the district court in the Western 
District of Washington held that the defendant could allocate its 
overhead, even if its infringement was willful.38 The court worried that 
a contrary rule would award the copyright owner “more than just 
profits,” and the infringer “would not only be deprived of whatever 
benefit it derived from the infringement, as was the apparent intent of 
Congress, but would also suffer affirmative punishment.”39 
The Northern District of California reached a similar conclusion 
in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.40 There, Oracle claimed that 
Google infringed its copyright in the Java programming platform, and 
Google sought to preclude evidence of willfulness from the trial.41 
Oracle argued that willfulness would be relevant to the issue of 
whether overhead could be deducted in disgorgement.42 The district 
court reviewed Ninth Circuit case law on the subject and surveyed 
cases from other circuits as well.43 It acknowledged that another 
district court in California had held that willful infringers could not 
deduct overhead,44 but it ultimately disagreed with that conclusion.45 
The court held that all non-tax “overhead deductions will be allowed 
regardless of willfulness” as long as the claimed expenses were “of 
actual assistance in the production, distribution, or sale of the 
infringing product.”46 
B. Overhead Is Not Deductible  
Other courts have held that overhead should not be deducted in 
calculating even an innocent infringer’s profits, at least as long as the 
infringement did not actually increase the overhead costs. These 
courts maintain that allowing such a deduction would permit the 
infringer to subsidize legitimate activities through infringement and 
 
 38.  ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1169 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 39.  Id. at 1168. 
 40.  Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 41.  Id. at 948. 
 42.  Id. at 949. 
 43.  Id. at 951–54. 
 44.  Id. at 954. 
 45.  Id. at 954–55. 
 46.  Id. at 955. 
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would not create an appropriate deterrent to infringement. These 
courts also note that the infringement is not a but-for cause of these 
costs and therefore they should not be deducted. The Seventh Circuit 
has taken this approach, along with district courts in the Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits. 
In Taylor v. Meirick,47 a copyright infringement action involving 
topographical maps, the Seventh Circuit adopted the incremental 
approach,48 preventing the infringer from deducting overhead as an 
expense in the calculation of profits from infringement. Judge Posner, 
writing for the court, articulated a deterrence-based view of 
disgorgement, noting that disgorgement “discourages infringement” 
because it eliminates the incentive to profitably infringe rather than to 
seek a license from the copyright holder.49 Thus, to properly deter 
infringement, fixed overhead should not be allocated toward the 
infringing products. In other words, the court made the deduction of 
overhead turn not on the defendant’s willfulness but instead on 
whether the costs would have been incurred even in the absence of 
infringement. 50 “Costs that would be incurred anyway should not be 
subtracted, because by definition they cannot be avoided by curtailing 
the profit-making activity.”51  
In JBJ Fabrics, Inc. v. Mark Industries, Inc.,52 a judge in the Central 
District of California opined that overhead should be deducted on the 
full absorption basis,53 but the court believed that Ninth Circuit 
precedent tugged in favor of Judge Posner’s reasoning in Taylor. Thus, 
the court held that overhead may be deducted only if it was actually 
 
 47.  Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 48.  See Stephen E. Margolis, The Profits of Infringement: Richard Posner v. Learned 
Hand, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1540 (2007). 
 49.  Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1120. 
 50.  Id. at 1121. 
 51.  Id. Shortly after Taylor, Judge Posner, sitting as a district judge by designation, 
reached a similar conclusion in a different copyright case. See Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc., 
574 F. Supp. 400, 412 (N.D. Ill. 1983), vacated, 767 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he only 
costs that would be relevant in deciding what profits ASI made on these contracts would be 
short-run variable costs, for those are the only costs it would have saved by not infringing.”). 
 52.  JBJ Fabrics, Inc. v. Mark Indus., Inc., No. CV 86-4881 FFF, 1987 WL 47381, at *6 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1987). 
 53.  Id. (“If left to its own devices, the Court would think that a reasonable approach is 
that overhead expenses should be deducted” because to disregard overhead would “fly in the 
face of the way businessmen compute their profits and determine whether a particular item was 
profitable or not.”). 
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increased by the infringement.54 The Tenth Circuit has not specifically 
spoken to the issue, but a judge in the District of Kansas followed the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach in Taylor, holding that fixed costs were not 
deductible from revenues in calculating an infringer’s profit.55 The 
court held that the deductibility of these costs would not change 
regardless of whether the infringement was willful—the costs were not 
deductible even if the infringement was unintentional.56 
C. Overhead Is Not Deductible for Willful Infringers  
Still other courts predicate the deductibility of overhead on the 
willfulness vel non of the infringement. Under this approach, 
inadvertent infringers may deduct overhead in calculating the profits 
of infringement, but willful infringers may not. These courts are 
concerned about the incentives that would exist for willful 
infringement if these infringers could shift the overhead costs for their 
legitimate products onto the infringing products, thereby subsidizing 
the legitimate business through infringement.57 The Eighth Circuit 
and district courts in the Third and Ninth Circuits have taken 
this  approach. 
In Jarvis v. A&M Records, Inc., a district court in the Third Circuit 
drew a distinction between willful infringement and non-willful 
infringement, holding that “[e]ven overhead may be deducted, 
provided that the defendant’s violation of plaintiff’s copyright was not 
willful. However, if defendant’s conduct is willful, overhead may not 
be deducted.” 58 In Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., the Eastern 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1251 (D. Kan. 1998). 
The court preferred to describe the deductible costs as variable and the non-deductible costs as 
fixed, rather than referring to overhead because, on the evidence provided, some potentially 
variable costs had been characterized as “overhead.” Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See, e.g., Hamil Am., Inc. v. SGS Studio, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2513(JSM), 1998 WL 
19991, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Hamil Am. Inc. v. 
GFI, 193 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 58.  Jarvis v. A & M Records, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 282, 294 (D.N.J. 1993) 
(citation  omitted). 
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District of Pennsylvania tentatively reached the same conclusion, 
speculating that analogous Third Circuit precedent required it.59  
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to 
allocate overhead toward the infringing products in Saxon v. Blann.60 
In that case, allocation of overhead would have reduced the 
recoverable profits from $19,843.45 to $1,426.70.61 The district 
court refused the defendants’ urging to allocate overhead, and the 
Eighth Circuit, noting that the district court had determined the 
defendants to be willful infringers, agreed.62 The Eighth Circuit held 
that “[o]verhead may not be deducted from gross revenues to arrive 
at profits when an infringement was deliberate or willful.”63 Thus, the 
court implied, but did not hold, that overhead would be deductible 
for non-willful infringers. 
The Central District of California judge in Williams v. Bridgeport 
Music recognized that the Ninth Circuit had not explicitly ruled on 
the issue but determined that the circuit court would most likely 
follow “other sister circuits” in holding overhead unallocable in cases 
of willful infringement.64 As a precaution, however, the trial judge 
separated out the amount of overhead in the jury verdict form so that 
a reversal by the Ninth Circuit would not require a retrial.65 
D. Unclear as to When Overhead Is Deductible  
 A number of courts have addressed the question of overhead 
allocation without reaching a clear decision regarding what 
circumstances, if any, permit overhead to be deducted in calculating 
the profits of infringement. Some courts, for example, have discussed 
in dicta whether willfulness should affect overhead allocation, but have 
not directly answered the question. Courts that have discussed the 
 
 59.  Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1014, 1025 & n.19 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
(discussing the trademark case of Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 
140 (3d Cir. 1953)). 
 60.  Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 61.  Id. at 680–81. 
 62.  Id. at 681. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 
4479500, at *26, *25 n.21 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015); Blurred Lines Case, supra note 7, ECF 
No. 339, at 32–33. 
 65.  Blurred Lines Case, supra note 7, ECF No. 339, at 34–36. 
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issue without resolving it include the First Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, 
the Sixth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit. In addition, the Third 
Restatement does not take a clear position on this question. 
1. First Circuit 
In Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc.,66 the First Circuit distinguished 
between copyright damages—oriented toward the plaintiff ’s loss—
and an accounting for the defendant’s profits—oriented toward the 
defendant’s gain. In doing so, the court recognized that the infringer’s 
sales do not necessarily deprive the plaintiff of sales; the parties may 
compete in non-overlapping markets such that the “profits which were 
made by the infringer may bear no relation to the damages suffered 
by the copyright proprietor,” and an accounting for the defendant’s 
profits is available even if the copyright holder had made no effort to 
commercialize its copyright.67 
The court also recognized that overhead allocation can result in a 
very real advantage to the defendant, making the defendant better off 
as a result of the infringement because “the fixed general overhead 
expenses . . . presumably would have been borne by him even had he 
not participated in the infringement complained of.”68 “In such a 
case,” the court continued, “it would be difficult to deny that the 
infringer has reaped a benefit in dollars and cents from the 
infringement, for which he ought to be accountable.”69 The court 
then raised the issue of willfulness, speculating that “[p]ossibly a 
deduction for overhead should be allowed in such a case when the 
infringement is innocent and denied when the infringement is 
conscious and deliberate.”70 Ultimately, however, the court remained 
noncommittal because the plaintiff did not raise the issue of the 
allocability of overhead as a general matter—instead, the plaintiffs’ 
complaint went to the sufficiency of the evidence.71 The court, 
 
 66.  Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 1942). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 348 (“Manufacturers are frequently glad to make a contract at a price which 
yields no net profit on a strict cost accounting basis but which does yield sufficient profit to carry 
a portion of the inescapable overhead.”). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 348–49. 
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therefore, assumed without deciding that “a deduction for overhead 
is allowable if properly established by proof.”72 
2. Fifth Circuit 
In Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., the Fifth Circuit discussed 
allocation of overhead in a case of willful trademark infringement.73 
The district court had refused to allocate overhead toward the 
infringing products, noting that “the unlawful venture increased the 
gross profits without swelling the gross expenses.”74 The Fifth Circuit 
agreed, affirming the district court’s decision because of the absence 
of any evidence that the infringing product actually increased overhead 
expenses.75 The Fifth Circuit went on to conclude that overhead could 
not be allocated “when the sales of an infringing product constitute 
only a small percentage of total sales.”76 Though unclear, it appears 
that the court based this rule on a presumption (perhaps irrebuttable) 
that when the infringing product’s sales are only a small percentage of 
the infringer’s overall sales, overhead is likely not increased by the 
infringing product.77 
3. Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of overhead allocation in a 
design patent case.78 The court first recognized conflicting arguments 
 
 72.  Id. at 349. 
 73. Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 582, 586 (5th Cir. 1980). The 
language of the Lanham Act differs slightly from the language of the Copyright Act. Compare 
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012), with 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012). In the general theory of 
restitution, disgorgement is reserved for conscious wrongdoers, and although some have 
expressed concern that language in the trademark statutes has altered this default, the general 
consensus is that conscious wrongdoing remains a predicate for disgorgement under trademark 
laws. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 525 
(Concise 4th ed., 2012). 
 74.  Maltina, 613 F.2d at 586. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. (“Accordingly, we think it unlikely, especially in the absence of any evidence to 
the contrary, that Cawy’s production of ‘Cristal’ increased its overhead expenses.”); see also 
Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing this 
portion of Maltina). 
 78.  Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1172 (6th Cir. 1980). 
Disgorgement, though statutorily eliminated as a remedy for infringement of utility patents, 
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related to but-for causation. From the infringer’s perspective, the fixed 
expenses “were neither caused nor increased by the infringing 
production,” so that “it may be argued that the infringer should not 
be permitted to avoid the expense by passing it on” to the plaintiff.79 
But, from the plaintiff ’s perspective, the infringing products “could 
not have been produced without expenses for utilities, administrative 
salaries, building space and the like being incurred,” so that “the fixed 
expenses are as necessary to the infringing production as are the 
variable expenses.”80 In light of this conflict, the court concluded, 
“Neither case law nor logic provides a clear rule for the proper 
treatment of fixed expenses in computing an award of profits.”81 Thus, 
the court decided that the issue could not be determined by clear-cut 
rules, but was a fact question that would vary from case to case.82 
4. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit considered the disgorgement question in 
Kamar International, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co.83 The court disagreed 
with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Maltina, and it “decline[d] to 
adopt a legal rule disallowing all overhead deductions merely because 
the sales of the infringing goods constitute a small percentage of total 
sales.”84 The court recognized that “[a] rule disallowing such expenses 
has the advantage of not allowing an infringer to reduce damages by 
deducting fixed overhead costs the infringer would have borne even 
without his sales of infringing goods.”85 But the court was also 
concerned that such a rule could allow the copyright holder to 
subsidize its profits through the infringer’s overhead:  
If the copyright owner currently uses his fixed overhead to capacity, 
he would obtain by lawsuit net profits greater than he could have 
earned. Not only will the profits not cost him an increase in his own 
 
remains a permissible remedy for infringement of design patents. See id. at 1172–73 (“Prior to 
1946 a utility patentee, like a design patentee today, could recover an infringer’s profits.”). 
 79.  Id. at 1172. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 1174–75. 
 83.  Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
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overhead; he will actually receive a premium representing the 
disallowance of the infringer’s overhead.86 
After surveying the case law, the court ultimately permitted the 
allocation of overhead to infringing sales without deciding whether 
willful infringement would be grounds to deny allocation,87 given that 
the district court had rejected a finding of willful infringement.88 
In Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,89 the Ninth 
Circuit again left open the question of whether willful infringers could 
deduct overhead from gross revenues to arrive at profits.90 The district 
court had found that the infringement was not conscious and 
deliberate, and the Ninth Circuit simply noted that, “at least where 
the infringement was not willful, conscious, or deliberate,” overhead 
may be deducted.91  
5. Restatement (Third) 
The black letter of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment does not take a position on the allocation of 
overhead,92 though the comments suggest that fixed overhead 
ordinarily should not be allocated.93 The Third Restatement’s section 
on general disgorgement reflects the concern that allocation of fixed 
overhead to the infringing conduct will render the defendant more 
profitable than it would have otherwise been.94 In the section directed 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 1331. 
 89.  Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 90.  Id. at 515. 
 91.  Id. Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit cited this dicta from Frank Music as supporting 
its own conclusion that “[o]verhead may not be deducted . . . when an infringement was 
deliberate or willful.” Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 92.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 51(5)(c) (noting that a “conscious 
wrongdoer or a defaulting fiduciary may be allowed a credit for money expended in acquiring 
or preserving the property or in carrying on the business,” but that this defendant “will 
ordinarily be denied any credit for contributions in the form of services, or for expenditures 
incurred directly in the commission of [the] wrong”). 
 93.  Id. § 51 cmt. h (“[T]he defendant will not be allowed to deduct expenses (such as 
ordinary overhead) that would have been incurred in any event, if the result would be that 
defendant’s wrongful activities—by defraying a portion of overall expenses—yield an increased 
profit from defendant’s operations as a whole.”). 
 94.  Id. 
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specifically to intellectual property rights, the Restatement echoes this 
concern.95 Although the Restatement does not directly take a 
normative position about what courts should do, it acknowledges that 
overhead deductions may properly be limited to “variable costs—
thereby avoiding an improper subsidy from the wrongful activity to 
the defendant’s overall cost structure.”96 The comments to the Third 
Restatement do not discuss willfulness in this context, but the 
illustrations seem to offer a Hamil America approach, in which both 
willful and non-willful infringers are permitted to allocate overhead, 
but willful infringers are held to a more exacting standard of proof.97 
The Third Restatement instructs courts to “make such allocations” 
and “recognize such credits or deductions” as “reason and fairness 
dictate,” consistent with the goal of disgorging profits without 
imposing a penalty.98 Unsurprisingly, the Third Restatement has been 
criticized as inconsistent in its approach to the allocation of overhead 
in disgorgement cases.99 
III. THE TRUST ANALOGY 
The Third Restatement, like many courts,100 has analogized 
disgorgement claims to claims against trustees who have defaulted on 
fiduciary obligations.101 Indeed, the Third Restatement points out that 
“the notion of treating the infringer as a trustee under a duty to 
account has been codified in the remedial provisions of the Copyright 
Act.”102 The “characterization of an infringer as a trustee ex maleficio” 
 
 95.  Id. § 42. 
 96.  Id. § 42 cmt. i. 
 97.  Id. § 42 cmt. i, illus. 21–22, reporter’s note i. 
 98.  Id. § 51(3)–(4). 
 99.  See Roach, supra note 22, at 1294–95 (“The position of the Third Restatement on 
the right to prove counter-restitution is both mixed and unclear.”). 
 100.  See, e.g., Packet Co. v. Sickles, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 611, 617 (1873) (“The rule in suits 
in equity . . . is that of converting the infringer into a trustee for the patentee as regards the 
profits thus made.”); Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 1942) (“[T]o 
prevent unjust enrichment the infringer was treated as a trustee ex maleficio of his ill gotten 
gains.”); Christensen v. Nat’l Brake & Elec. Co., 10 F.2d 856, 861 (E.D. Wis. 1924) (“[W]hen 
we test an infringer as one who is liable to account for profits upon the theory that he is a trustee 
ex maleficio, we are bound at once to look to both the debit and the credit side of trust 
obligation.”) (patent infringement). 
 101.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 51 reporter’s note i. 
 102.  Id. 
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arises because the infringer “is viewed as one who has profited through 
wrongful appropriation of a right, and is therefore called upon to 
account” to the plaintiff.103 
The trust analogy helps to distinguish copyright infringement 
cases from some other restitution cases, such as those of specific 
restitution. In specific restitution, no trust—constructive or 
otherwise—is necessary. Plaintiffs simply recover their property in the 
hands of the defendant. That property may have been altered in some 
way (and, to the extent it has lost value, the plaintiff will have a 
damages claim for that lost value), but there is no need to consider the 
defendant a “trustee” of the plaintiff ’s property.104 In these cases, the 
willfulness of the wrongdoer is relevant because it determines whether 
the wrongdoer may assert a counter-restitutionary claim against the 
property holder.105 
When a rightful owner recovers property through specific 
restitution, a party who has mistakenly improved that property has a 
separate claim in restitution against the owner. In other words, when 
the defendant has, at its own expense, inadvertently added value to 
the plaintiff ’s property, the defendant has a restitutionary claim 
against the plaintiff. Imagine, for example, that A, relying on an errant 
survey, mistakenly builds a hotel on B’s property and serves several 
guests before B learns of the hotel.106 B has several potential claims 
against A, including a claim to retake possession of the property and 
a claim to disgorge the hotel’s profits. But A, as a mistaken improver, 
has a counter-restitutionary claim against B because B’s property is 
now more valuable thanks to A’s expenditures.107 If B kept the 
 
 103.  Christensen, 10 F.2d at 861–62. 
 104.  As trusts were of equitable origin, the trust analogy—with its consequent recovery 
of the infringer’s profits—was available only incidentally with a request for an injunction. Root 
v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 207–08, 215–16 (1881). 
 105.  ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 139–42 (2012); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 19, § 51 cmt. h (“[T]he defendants in these cases, in seeking a credit against 
liability to the claimant, are asserting what is in effect a restitutionary setoff or counterclaim. 
Although the transactions take various forms, in each case the defendant’s implicit counterclaim 
is an attempt to recover (through a credit against liability) the value to the claimant of benefits 
conferred without request.”). 
 106.  This hypothetical is loosely based on the case of Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E. 2d 805 
(W. Va. 1969). 
 107.  Whether and to what extent B can recover against A on his counter-restitutionary 
claim depends on many things, including the relative fault of the parties and whether A actually 
benefitted from B’s expenditures. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 51. 
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improved property without any outlay on his own part, B would be 
unjustly enriched. Thus, A may pursue his unjust enrichment claim 
against B even if A negligently relied on the errant survey. 
But, where one party intentionally improves the property of 
another at its own expense, that party usually has no claim in counter-
restitution. The willful wrongdoer has “willingly taken the risk of 
losing the value of the benefit conferred on the owner.”108 Stated 
differently, the willful wrongdoer is an “officious intermeddler” under 
the law,109 and any benefits the wrongdoer confers are gratuitous. So, 
when the plaintiff claims in restitution for the wrongful appropriation 
of its property, the defendant has a counter-restitutionary claim for the 
value added to the property only if the defendant did not act 
intentionally.110 Under this explanation of disgorgement, “[t]he idea 
of punishment, with its one-sided focus on the defendant, is 
entirely  absent.”111 
If this counter-restitution reasoning were applied to copyright 
cases, the willful infringer would be liable to the copyright holder for 
the infringing product’s gross revenues, with no offset for even its 
variable expenses. Disgorgement would not be of the infringement-
 
 108.  WEINRIB supra note 105, at 140. 
 109.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 2(3); LAYCOCK, supra note 73, at 495; 
WEINRIB supra note 105, at 141. 
 110.  Andrew Kull, Restitution’s Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 18 (2003); see also 1 
GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 3.12, at 303 (1978) (“[T]he true basis of 
the requirement is to prevent the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff, who is himself seeking 
restitution based on the defendant’s unjust enrichment.”). 
 111.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 141. Similarly, coercion of future potential wrongdoers 
is not the driving force behind the refusal to allow counter-restitution claims by intentional 
wrongdoers. This explanation helps make sense of the Supreme Court’s decision in E.E. Bolles 
Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432 (1882), in which the Court affirmed the rule 
that a willful trespasser who severs timber from land is liable for the severed value of the timber 
rather than the lower pre-cut value. The Court remarked that holding the willful trespasser to 
the greater liability “punish[es] the fraud by fixing the person with the value of the whole of the 
property which he has so furtively taken.” Id. at 434. But, in E.E. Bolles, the Court extended this 
enhanced liability to a third-party who innocently bought the severed timber from the 
wrongdoer, despite the absence of any intent or otherwise culpable conduct on his part. Id. at 
433. This makes sense only as the subrogation of the original trespasser’s counter-restitution 
claim, if any, onto the innocent buyer, who purchases subject to any claims by the rightful owner, 
which are in turn subject to any claims in counter-restitution the trespasser could have asserted 
against the owner. This cannot be the result of our desire to punish the innocent third-party 
buyer, but instead is the application of non-punitive and non-coercive restitutionary principles. 
But see Kull, supra note 110, at 23 (contending that restitution acts punitively by disallowing 
claims of conscious wrongdoers). 
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created profits, but of the infringement-created revenues. But this 
counter-restitution reasoning is most commonly applied in cases with 
claims seeking specific restitution of tangible property rather than 
those with claims seeking an accounting (disgorgement) incidental to 
injunctive relief.112 In cases of the latter sort, it has been suggested that 
the trust analogy is more appropriate.113 
The trust analogy rests on the fiction that the infringer deals with 
the copyright holder’s property as a trustee and, as such, must account 
for any proceeds from the sale of the plaintiff ’s property.114 “The idea 
behind the ascription of agency was that the only legal basis for selling 
what belongs to another is that the seller is acting as the owner’s agent 
and therefore holds the proceeds on the owner’s behalf.”115 Thus, as 
Professor Rounds explains, “Any profit that accrues to the trustee as 
a result of the trustee’s unauthorized self-dealing must be turned over 
to the trust estate. On the other hand, the trustee is entitled to 
indemnity from the trust estate for reasonable expenses incurred in 
the course of administering the trust.”116 This trust analogy helps to 
distinguish copyright infringement from cases of specific restitution, 
and it sheds light on the relevance of the defendant’s willfulness. 
A trustee engaged in an unauthorized self-dealing transaction will 
be forced to disgorge the fruits of its misdealing, but even the 
defaulting trustee is permitted to reduce its liability by the expenses 
incurred in the transaction.117 “Even for cases relating to disloyal 
 
 112. Roach, supra note 34, at 514–15 (discussing timber or minerals severed from land, as 
well as stolen personal property). Indeed, timber and minerals have long been recognized as 
exceptions under claims at law. Bishop of Winchester v. Knight (1717) 24 Eng. Rep. 447, 448; 
1 P. Wms. 406, 407. Roach says that “the innocent defendant that bought a stolen car will 
generally lose the car without compensation for any money expended to repair or improve the 
car.” Roach, supra note 22, at 515. But this is not true in all jurisdictions; some provide the 
innocent defendant with a counter-restitution claim against the plaintiff for the market value of 
improvements to the property. See Iacomini v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 497 A.2d 854 
(N.H. 1985). 
 113.  See Roach, supra note 34, at 514–15. 
 114.  Burdell v. Denig, 92 U.S. 716, 720 (1876) (stating, in a patent case, that an award 
of profits “applies eminently and mainly to cases in equity, and is based upon the idea that the 
infringer shall be converted into a trustee”). 
 115.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 127. 
 116.  Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Relief for IP Rights Infringement Is Primarily Equitable: How 
American Legal Education Is Short-Changing the 21st Century Corporate Litigator, 26 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 313, 336–37 (2010). 
 117.  3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 18.1.2.6, at 
1294–95 (5th ed. 2007); 4 id. § 22.2.1, at 1634–35; Roach, supra note 22, at 1288; Rounds, 
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fiduciaries—claims involving the highest level of concern for courts in 
equity—the disloyal trustee is entitled to indemnity for his reasonable 
expenses . . . .”118 And just as even the consciously defaulting trustee 
may claim indemnity for expenses reasonably incurred to benefit the 
trust assets,119 so too may the willful infringer.120 
The trust analogy helps to explain why, in the Copyright Act, 
Congress limited the infringement remedy to disgorgement of profits 
(rather than all revenues), even for willful infringers.121 The analogy 
also helps to explain another controversial aspect of the Copyright 
Act—the Act makes disgorgement available as an infringement remedy 
against even inadvertent infringers.122 Congress believed that, “‘on 
reasoning as old as Aristotle,’ an infringer should disgorge any profits 
attributable to infringement, irrespective of his culpability.”123 This 
belief is compatible with the trust analogy—just as the defaulting 
trustee uses something that in equity belongs to the beneficiary and 
so must relinquish any claim to the profits resulting from such use, the 
infringer uses something that belongs to the copyright holder and 
must relinquish the profits of this use. 
The trust analogy helps to explain why Congress may have created 
disgorgement liability even for innocent infringers, but it does not 
answer the question of whether disgorged profits should be offset 
by  an allocation of overhead toward the infringing products. 
 
supra note 116, at 348–49 (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 245 cmts. c–d (AM. 
LAW INST. 1957) [hereinafter 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]). 
 118.  Roach, supra note 34, at 538. 
 119.  1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 117, § 245. The First Restatement of 
Restitution required a contracting party seeking rescission to restore any benefits received to the 
other party, whether the transfer was induced “by fraud . . . or mistake.” RESTATEMENT OF 
RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 177 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST.  1936). 
 120.  17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012) (providing for disgorgement of “profits”); Roach, supra 
note 34, at 521; see 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 117, §§ 244–45. 
 121.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
 122.  See Ciolino, supra note 4, at 29–30; id. at 35–40, 61–63 (arguing that disgorgement 
in copyright infringement should be eliminated and that willful infringement should be deterred 
through exemplary damages). Disgorgement in patent is unavailable as a remedy. Caprice L. 
Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 653, 655 (2010). In trademark infringement, disgorgement turns on willfulness, 
at least under some courts’ analysis. George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1540 
(2d Cir. 1992). 
 123.  Ciolino, supra note 4, at 39–40 (quoting BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW 
OF COPYRIGHT 72 (1967)). 
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To  answer  this question, we need to examine the purposes of the 
disgorgement  remedy. 
IV. PURPOSES OF DISGORGEMENT 
Disgorgement became a statutorily authorized remedy for 
copyright infringement in 1909.124 The statute allows a plaintiff to 
disgorge a defendant’s profits even in cases of non-willful copyright 
infringement.125 But long before disgorgement was a statutorily 
enacted copyright remedy, it was an equitable remedy that reached 
beyond copyright to restitutionary cases more generally.126 Perhaps the 
best-known examples include Olwell v. Nye & Nissen127 and Edwards 
v. Lee’s Administrator.128 In both cases, the property owners’ legal 
damages were slight. In Olwell, the defendant converted Olwell’s egg-
washing machine, but the machine was in storage before the 
defendant’s conscription, and it took Olwell some three years to notice 
that the machine was missing.129 Moreover, the machine seemed to be 
no worse for wear.130 In Edwards v. Lee’s Administrator, the plaintiff ’s 
land included portions of an underground cave whose only entrance 
was on the defendant’s property.131 The defendant sold tours of the 
cave, including the portions located on plaintiff ’s land, but there was 
no dispute that the plaintiff could not have accessed or exploited the 
cave on his own.132 
Both defendants sought to limit the plaintiffs’ recovery to the 
rental value of the properties, but in both cases, the courts disgorged 
the defendants’ profits made from use of the plaintiffs’ properties.133 
The courts thought it unjust to allow the defendants to retain the 
 
 124.  Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) (“Prior to the 
Copyright Act of 1909, there had been no statutory provision for the recovery of profits, but 
that recovery had been allowed in equity both in copyright and patent cases as appropriate 
equitable relief incident to a decree for an injunction.”). 
 125.  17 U.S.C. § 504; LAYCOCK, supra note 73, at 525. 
 126.  See generally Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 1942) 
(noting that “accountability of an infringer for the profits he has made had its origin in equity”). 
 127.  Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946). 
 128.  Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936). 
 129.  Olwell, 173 P.2d at 652–53. 
 130.  Id. at 653–54. 
 131.  Edwards, 96 S.W.2d at 1029. 
 132.  Id. at 1030. 
 133.  Id. at 1030, 1032; Olwell, 173 P.2d at 653–54. 
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profits acquired by wrongdoing.134 As a result, even though the 
plaintiffs’ use-value damages were slight, the measure of recovery was 
the defendants’ gains rather than the plaintiffs’ losses.135 
Disgorgement cases outside of copyright, such as Olwell and 
Edwards, may be useful in analyzing the proper method of allocating 
overhead for copyright infringement because “there is no basis to 
conclude that the measure of unjust enrichment for claims regarding 
patents, design patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets were 
related to anything but traditional law for accounting in equity.”136 In 
order to determine whether to allow the deduction of overhead 
expenses from infringement revenues, we must determine the purpose 
behind the disgorgement remedy. Once we have identified the 
purpose or purposes of disgorgement as a remedy, we can consider 
whether and to what extent the allocation or non-allocation of 
overhead furthers that purpose in copyright infringement cases. 
A. Utility and Deterrence 
Some have argued that disgorgement serves a coercive purpose, 
acting as a deterrent to would-be infringers by depriving them of the 
fruits of infringement.137 For example, in Kamar International, Inc. v. 
Russ Berrie & Co.,138 the Ninth Circuit suggested that “[a]n award of 
infringer’s profits is aimed in part at deterring infringements.”139 
Disgorgement unquestionably has at least a moderate deterrent 
 
 134.  Edwards, 96 S.W.2d at 1032; Olwell, 173 P.2d at 653 (discussing the wrongdoer’s 
duty “to repay an unjust and unmerited enrichment”). 
 135.  Olwell, 173 P.2d at 654; Edwards, 96 S.W.2d at 1032. 
 136.  Roach, supra note 34, at 506; see also Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 
346 (1st Cir. 1942) (when Congress statutorily authorized disgorgement, “there was no change 
in the principle upon which such relief had theretofore been granted by courts of equity”). 
 137.  See, e.g., Kull, supra note 110, at 18–19 (“Both disgorgement and punitive damages 
are therefore justified by the need to create a stronger disincentive to wrongful conduct—
conduct that the threat of liability for actual damages does not adequately deter.”). 
 138.  Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 139.  Id. The court stated that these dual goals could “best be achieved by allowing a 
deduction for overhead only when the infringer can demonstrate it was of actual assistance in 
the production, distribution or sale of the infringing product,” although it did not explain how 
such deductions would further these purposes. Id. 
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effect  in that it usually renders the wrongful act unprofitable to 
the  defendant.140 
Unsurprisingly, Judge Posner champions a deterrence-based view 
of disgorgement. He maintains that disgorgement promotes 
economic efficiency by deterring infringers from bypassing the 
market. He points out that plaintiffs seek disgorgement only when the 
infringer’s profits exceed the plaintiff’s provable losses—in other 
words, where the defendant puts the purloined property to a more 
efficient use than the plaintiff would have (or, at least, than the 
plaintiff can prove that he or she would have). Judge Posner notes that 
it may seem strange to “punish” the defendant for increased efficiency, 
but this “makes any would-be infringer negotiate directly with the 
owner of a copyright that he wants to use.”141 Limiting damages to 
the copyright holder’s loss would not adequately deter the “forced 
exchange” in which the infringer bypasses the market by stealing 
the  copyright.142 
The Third Restatement offers both deterrence (forward look-
ing)  and corrective-justice (backward looking) rationales for 
disgorgement.143 Many cases follow suit, identifying mixed purposes 
for the disgorgement remedy.144 
This identification of multiple purposes suggests that the courts 
and the Restatement’s drafters recognize the inability of deterrence 
alone to fully account for disgorgement practices. If the purpose of 
disgorgement is to eliminate any incentive to infringe, then 
infringement must be rendered unprofitable.145 The remedy must 
deter the wrongdoer’s “opportunistic behavior by making it worthless 
 
 140.  United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 1061 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“Disgorgement, which deprives wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains, deters violations of the 
law by making illegal activity unprofitable.”). 
 141.  Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 3 cmt. c (“Restitution requires full 
disgorgement of profit by a conscious wrongdoer, not just because of the moral judgment 
implicit in the rule of this section, but because any lesser liability would provide an inadequate 
incentive to lawful behavior.”). The majority of the Third Restatement’s discussion of 
disgorgement focuses on the incentives of future potential wrongdoers. See id. ch. 7, intro. note 
(“Restitution by a profit measure (often called ‘disgorgement’) is normally directed at conscious 
wrongdoers—not against blameless tortfeasors whose conduct would not be affected by the 
prospect of liability measured by wrongful gain.”). 
 144.  See infra Section III.D. 
 145.  Rx Depot, 438 F.3d at 1058 & n.4. 
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to him, which can be done by making him hand over all his profits 
from the breach to the promisee.”146 But if disgorgement’s coercive 
effect is the sole concern, there is no reason to limit the remedy to the 
amount of the defendant’s profits. Holding the infringer liable for any 
amount equal to or greater than the infringer’s profits would produce 
this effect. And, in fact, the infringer’s prospective liability must 
exceed its profits to adequately deter an infringer who thinks that its 
infringement might go undetected.147 Thus, effective deterrence 
requires a remedy that exceeds the defendant’s profits by an amount 
proportional to future defendants’ perceptions of the likelihood of 
undetected infringement—we must make prospective infringement 
unprofitable after the defendant discounts the likely remedy by the 
odds of detection.148 Therefore, disgorgement as it presently exists—
limited to the infringer’s profits—does not effectively deter. 
That said, perhaps there is a utilitarian argument for limiting the 
recovery to the defendant’s profits—greater recoveries may 
unacceptably increase the cost of production for accidental infringers. 
People who risk inadvertent infringement149—singers, writers, 
producers, authors, painters, and others—may fear extreme liability so 
greatly that they take excessive and inefficient precautions against 
infringement. For example, they might run excessive searches for 
anything that might be considered infringement. Or they might 
 
 146.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 129 (9th ed. 2014). 
 147.  With the remedy limited to the defendant’s profits, if the defendant gets away with 
the wrongdoing, it will be better off than it would have been acting legitimately, and, if it gets 
caught, it is in the same position as if it had acted legitimately. See Gergen, supra note 6, at 829 
n.11. Gergen’s proffered explanation for the under-deterrence of disgorgement is that “what is 
permissible in the way of deterrence is constrained by what the instinct for retribution 
allows.” Id. 
 148.  If the defendant expects to make $100 from infringement and expects that there is a 
50% chance of being held liable, then the defendant must face a threatened remedy of at least 
$200 in order to be property incentivized against the infringement. Any lesser amount 
renders  the infringement prospectively profitable and would not deter a rational profit-
maximizing  defendant. 
 149.  An example of inadvertent infringement is the idea of “subconscious copying,” in 
which a songwriter has heard a song and, in writing a later song, subconsciously includes portions 
of the prior song in his own song. Examples include George Harrison’s “My Sweet Lord” (which 
subconsciously copied The Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine”), and Michael Bolton’s “Love Is a 
Wonderful Thing” (which subconsciously copied the Isley Brothers’ “Love is a Wonderful 
Thing”). Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482–84 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, 
inadvertent infringement may arise when the infringer honestly but erroneously believes that its 
infringement falls within the fair use defense. 
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refrain from using portions of a copyrighted work even though such a 
use would constitute fair use. In other words, excessive liability risks 
inhibiting the constitutional goal of the promotion of “Science and 
the useful Arts.”150 Consequently, limiting disgorgement to the 
infringer’s profits—that is, attempting to remove from the infringer 
all gains stemming from infringement, but going no farther than 
that—may be seen as a compromise that best balances the 
goal  of  deterring infringement with limiting search-cost and 
other  inefficiencies. 
B. Punishment 
Some have focused on the retributive interest as a basis for 
disgorgement.151 The retributive interest and the coercive interest 
differ in that the retributive interest is backward-looking rather than 
forward-looking; it seeks punishment for previously-committed, 
morally culpable conduct. The coercive interest, on the other hand, is 
indifferent to the defendant’s previously-committed conduct, 
except  insofar as disgorgement for past conduct will deter 
future  wrongdoing. 
The recent unanimous Supreme Court decision in Kokesh v. SEC152 
distinguished the “disgorgement” in SEC enforcement proceedings—
which it held to be penal in nature—from traditional common-law 
disgorgement. In Kokesh, the applicability of the statute of limitations 
hinged on whether the liability imposed on the defendant amounted 
to a “penalty,” as that term was used in the statute.153 Concluding that 
SEC disgorgement operated as a penalty, the Court took pains to note 
that its holding applied only to “disgorgement, as applied in SEC 
enforcement actions.”154 Indeed, the Court’s analysis focused on several 
 
 150.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 151.  E.g., Tricia Bozyk, Disgorging American Business: An Examination of Overbroad 
Remedies in Civil RICO Cases, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 129, 140 (2006) (“Disgorgement can be 
construed as punitive in nature rather than a method of restitution.”). 
 152.  Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
 153.  Id. at 1639–40. The courts below had held that the SEC’s recovery was 
“disgorgement” rather than a “penalty,” so that the limitations statute did not apply. Id. at 1641. 
 154.  Id. at 1642 n.3 (emphasis added); see also id. (noting that the Court’s opinion 
“should be interpreted as an opinion on . . . whether courts have properly applied disgorgement 
principles in this context”). The Court was careful throughout its opinion to refer to the remedy 
in this type of case as “SEC disgorgement” rather than merely as “disgorgement.” 
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related characteristics present in SEC “disgorgement” orders not 
found in traditional disgorgement. 
First, the SEC penalties were imposed for offenses committed 
against the state, rather than against private parties.155 If the action had 
been “a compensatory remedy for a private wrong,” such as a violation 
of the rights of the plaintiff, it would not be penal.156 Second, SEC 
disgorgement penalties are paid to the court, and the court has 
discretion to determine how to distribute the funds.157 In other words, 
the money does not necessarily find its way to the victim of the 
wrongdoing—some disgorged funds “are dispersed to the United 
States Treasury.”158 Traditional disgorgement, by contrast, is “paid 
entirely to a private plaintiff.”159 Finally, lower courts had emphasized 
the “primary purpose” of the penalty was deterrence.160 Because the 
disgorgements were government-initiated, and were therefore public-
law-based rather than private-law-based, their use as a deterrent could 
only be described as penal, because “deterrence [is] not [a] legitimate 
nonpunitive governmental objectiv[e].”161  
The Court rejected the government’s argument that the SEC 
disgorgement was remedial rather than punitive because it sought only 
to restore the status quo ante.162 In SEC enforcement actions, 
defendants are sometimes required to “disgorge” gains made by other 
people,163 as Kokesh was.164 Such disgorgement does not restore the 
status quo because the defendant must pay money in excess of his 
wrongful receipts.165 And “SEC disgorgement sometimes is ordered 
without consideration of a defendant’s expenses that reduced the 
amount of illegal profit,”166—a result that “does not simply restore the 
 
 155.  Id. at 1643. 
 156.  Id. at 1642. The Court’s example was a claim for statutory damages for copyright 
infringement. Id. 
 157.  Id. at 1644. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See id. at 1643. 
 160.  Id. at 1643–44. 
 161.  Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979) (alterations in original)). 
 162.  Id. at 1644. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158, 1164–65 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 
1635  (2017). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644–45. 
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status quo; it leaves the defendant worse off.”167 In contrast to 
traditional disgorgements, SEC disgorgements “‘go beyond 
compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants 
wrongdoers’ as a consequence of violating public laws.” They 
consequently constitute a “penalty” within the meaning of 
the  statute.168  
Professor Kull notes that the “salient feature of most restitution 
for wrongs—the fact that the remedy gives the plaintiff more than he 
lost—seems to point toward a punitive rationale.”169 But he also 
observes that punishment is an unlikely candidate to explain 
traditional disgorgement,170 given that disgorgement is limited to the 
infringer’s profits and does not depend on the defendant’s wealth or 
business success in general.171 If punishment were our primary 
concern, then there would seem to be little reason to permit the 
defendant to deduct even variable expenses from the profits, as the 
Court noted in Kokesh,172 or, for that matter, to tie the award to the 
defendant’s profits at all.173 In other words, there would be little 
reason to distinguish disgorgement from punitive damages more 
generally and no obvious reason to prefer disgorgement over a 
traditional form of punitive damages.174 Moreover, existing copyright 
law permits disgorgement of the profits of even innocent infringers,175 
whereas, under a punishment theory, disgorgement should be limited 
 
 167.  Id. at 1645. 
 168.  Id. (quoting Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 451–52 (2013)). 
 169.  Kull, supra note 110, at 18. 
 170.  See id.; see also Christensen v. Nat’l Brake & Elec. Co., 10 F.2d 856, 862 (E.D. Wis. 
1924) (“It was not and is not intended . . . that the principles of stating the account . . . should 
be applied to produce purely punitive results.”) (patent infringement); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 
1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Disgorgement is remedial and not punitive.”). 
 171.  City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 139 (1878) 
(“[T]hough the defendant’s general business be ever so profitable, if the use of the invention 
has not contributed to the profits, none can be recovered. . . . [A] court of equity cannot give a 
decree for profits . . . as a punishment for the infringement.”). 
 172.  Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644–45. 
 173.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 141 (“No attempt is made to calibrate the unrecouped 
costs to the trespasser’s desert. From a punitive standpoint, this is odd, since the amount of the 
supposed punishment is not necessarily related to the trespasser’s culpability.”). 
 174.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 51 cmt. k (noting that exemplary damages 
may be needed to supplement disgorgement, since disgorgement “imposes no net loss on the 
defendant,” and that the “rationale of punitive or exemplary damages is independent of the law 
of unjust enrichment”). 
 175.  See Ciolino, supra note 4, at 30. 
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to cases of a sufficiently culpable mens rea.176 In addition, the 
Copyright Act already creates criminal liability for willful copyright 
infringement,177 and criminal punishment serves the retributive 
interest (or, depending on one’s jurisprudence, the coercive 
interest).178 Consequently, disgorgement, if punitive or deterrent, risks 
overpunishing or overdeterring because it coexists with criminal 
penalties already designed to adequately punish or deter. Presumably 
for these reasons, courts and scholars,179 as well as the Third 
Restatement,180 object to a punitive justification of disgorgement. 
C. Corrective Justice 
For the reasons discussed above, a punishment rationale offers the 
least promising explanation of disgorgement.181 A deterrence 
rationale, though more promising, still does not fully address the 
current practices surrounding disgorgement, including its limitation 
to the profits of the wrongdoer (rather than being adjusted by an 
odds-of-detection multiplier) and its application to inadvertent and 
even no-fault infringement.182 A better candidate for explaining the 
current practice is corrective justice. Corrective justice suggests “that 
wrongful gains and losses are to be annulled,”183 and it is sometimes 
 
 176.  This is true for a deterrence theory as well, although the particular mens rea may 
differ between punishment theories and deterrence theories. 
 177.  17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012). In addition, some courts have questioned the traditional 
belief that punitive damages are not available outside of statutory damages in copyright. See, e.g., 
Blanch v. Koons, 329 F. Supp. 2d 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The weight of authority, however, 
rejects punitive damages. See 2 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 17:22 (2003). 
 178.  See John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 49–50 (Jules L. Coleman et al. eds., 2004). 
 179.  See supra notes 169–71. 
 180.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 51 cmt. h (“Denial of an otherwise 
appropriate deduction, by making the defendant liable in excess of net gains, results in a punitive 
sanction that the law of restitution normally attempts to avoid.”); id. § 51 cmt. k 
(“Disgorgement of wrongful gain is not a punitive remedy. While the remedy will be 
burdensome to the defendant in practice . . . the wrongdoer who is deprived of an illicit gain is 
ideally left in the position he would have occupied had there been no misconduct.”). 
 181.  See supra notes 169–78. 
 182.  See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
 183.  Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 432 
(1982) [hereinafter Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain]; see also JULES COLEMAN, 
RISKS AND WRONGS 369 (reprint 2003) (1992) [hereinafter COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS]. 
The question of whether corrective justice necessarily entails a duty on the part of a particular 
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described as “the relational structure of reasoning in private law.”184 
To annul wrongful gains and losses, we look to the “rightful position” 
of the parties. 
The “rightful position” inquiry is commonly undertaken in 
assessing a plaintiff ’s wrongful losses.185 This is because, in the run of 
tort cases, defendants do not profit financially from their wrongdoing, 
so most inquiries focus on restoring the wronged plaintiffs to their 
rightful positions.186 The defendant’s harm of the plaintiff “upsets the 
equilibrium that existed between the parties” prior to the harm,187 and 
the plaintiff is entitled to be restored to its pre-tort position, even if 
doing so results in the defendant being made worse off relative to its 
pre-tort position.188 (Some corrective-justice theorists, such as 
Professor Weinrib, reject the idea that the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss 
could exceed the defendant’s gain, instead positing that the plaintiff ’s 
loss and the defendant’s gain are always equal.189) 
In disgorgement cases, on the other hand, defendants have 
profited sufficiently from their invasions of the plaintiffs’ rights that 
they could put the plaintiffs in their but-for-the-wrong factual 
positions (arguably their rightful positions) and still remain better off 
 
person to pay for the wrongful losses or a claim on the part of a particular person to recover 
wrongful gains is taken up later. See infra Section IV.C.4. 
 184.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 2. 
 185.  See LAYCOCK, supra note 73, at 13. 
 186.  Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, supra note 183, at 424–26. 
 187.  Jules L. Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 451, 454 (1987) [hereinafter Coleman, Property]; see Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, 
Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (2000). Coleman’s early view of corrective justice stopped here. He 
rejected the idea that corrective justice requires the wrongdoer to compensate the plaintiff, 
concluding instead that it only requires the plaintiff to be compensated. See Coleman, Property, 
supra, at 461–62. 
 188.  Under the most common view of corrective justice, the defendant’s causation of the 
plaintiff’s loss triggers the defendant’s obligation to rectify that loss. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND 
WRONGS, supra note 183, at 320–24. 
 189.  See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 437–
38 (1987); see also Matthew H. Kramer, Of Aristotle and Ice Cream Cones: Reflections on Jules 
Coleman’s Theory of Corrective Justice, 16 QLR 279, 285–93 (1996). But see Sammons v. 
Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 1942) (“The profits which were made by the 
infringer may bear no relation to the damages suffered by the copyright proprietor.”); CHARLIE 
WEBB, REASON AND RESTITUTION: A THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 236–38 (2016) 
(countering Weinrib’s reading of Aristotle). See generally Lionel D. Smith, Disgorgement of the 
Profits of Breach of Contract: Property, Contract and “Efficient Breach,” 24 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 
121, 122 (1994) (asserting that, in disgorgement, “loss suffered by the plaintiff is irrelevant”). 
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than the defendants would have been in the absence of the 
wrongdoing.190 The corrective-justice account recognizes that such 
gains are “wrongful” and that they occurred at the plaintiffs’ 
expense.191 Consequently, corrective justice demands that the 
defendants disgorge their ill-gotten gains received through violation 
of the plaintiff ’s property rights.192 In other words, corrective justice 
seeks to annul both the plaintiff ’s wrongful loss and the defendant’s 
wrongful gain.193 
Most explanations of disgorgement explicitly speak the moral 
language of corrective justice,194 replete with references to “desert,”195 
“justice,”196 “fairness,”197 and “unconscionability.”198 These explan-
ations speak of what “rightfully” belongs to the plaintiff and the 
 
 190.  Some corrective-justice theorists insist that defendants’ gains and plaintiffs’ losses 
always correspond. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 189, at 293. 
 191.  COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 183, at 371 (referring to “restitutionary 
justice”); Kramer, supra note 189, at 284. 
 192.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 127 (“If [plaintiff’s] rights include the possibility of 
gain, then the defendant’s gain measures the extent of the plaintiff’s injury.”). 
 193.  Coleman, Property, supra note 187, at 463. 
 194.  SEC v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 93 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The 
primary purpose of this disgorgement is also well established: [It] is not to compensate 
[plaintiffs, but] it is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he was 
unjustly enriched.”); Kull, supra note 110, at 19 (“[T]here is no need to refer to punishment 
objectives to explain what restitution is doing. Restitution’s starting objective is . . . to strip the 
defendant of a wrongful gain.”). 
 195.  Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 546, 560 (1853) (stating, in a patent 
disgorgement case, that plaintiffs “will be allowed to claim that which, ex aequo et bono, is theirs, 
and nothing beyond this”); WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 117 (“Many of the current treatments 
of gain-based damages for torts focus on the defendant’s desert . . . .”). 
 196.  See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) 
(disgorgement is “given in accordance with the principles governing equity jurisdiction, not to 
inflict punishment but to prevent an unjust enrichment”); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 
145–46 (1888); Moses v. MacFerlan (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (K.B.) (“In one word, the 
gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged 
by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money.”). 
 197.  In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1250 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(“The purpose of awarding both actual damages and profits is ‘to prevent the infringer from 
unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.’” (quoting 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, 
§ 14.03)). 
 198.  Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 1942) (“The theory 
was that it was unconscionable for an infringer to retain a benefit which he had received by the 
appropriation and use of the plaintiff’s property right . . . .”). 
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defendant,199 and they assert that disgorgement seeks to deprive the 
defendant of “wrongful” gains without imposing a penalty on the 
wrongdoer. That is, disgorgement should deprive the defendant of any 
advantage it gained by infringement, but it should take no more than 
necessary to accomplish this purpose.200 In an early patent case (before 
the Patent Act eliminated disgorgement as a patent infringe-
ment  remedy), the Supreme Court emphasized this purpose 
of  disgorgement: 
 The reasons that have led to the adoption of [disgorgement] are, 
that it comes nearer than any other to doing complete justice 
between the parties; that in equity the profits made by the infringer 
of a patent belong to the patentee and not to the infringer; and that 
it is inconsistent with the ordinary principles and practice of courts 
of chancery, either, on the one hand, to permit the wrongdoer to 
profit by his own wrong, or, on the other hand, to make no 
allowance for the cost and expense of conducting his business, or to 
undertake to punish him by obliging him to pay more than a fair 
compensation to the person wronged.201 
Gain-based damages under a corrective-justice account seek to 
undo the benefits to the defendant that flowed from his implicit 
assertion of ownership in the plaintiff ’s property,202 or stated 
differently, to “reverse the wrong by showing, through the return of 
the benefits, that the law considers the defendant’s implicit assertion 
of ownership to be a nullity whose consequences are to be undone.”203 
D. Mixed Purposes 
Corrective justice holds the most promise for offering an internally 
coherent explanation of disgorgement. But many have suggested that 
 
 199.  The remedy is designed to achieve “a rational separation of the net profits so that 
neither party may have what rightfully belongs to the other.” Sheldon, 309 U.S. at 404 (quoting 
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 647 (1915)); Livingston, 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) at 560 (in a patent disgorgement case, reversing a judgment for what the defendants 
could have made, if they’d exercised diligence, and stating that plaintiffs “will be allowed to claim 
that which, ex aequo et bono, is theirs, and nothing beyond this”). 
 200.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 199; see also Levin Bros. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 
163, 165 (8th Cir. 1934). 
 201.  Tilghman, 125 U.S. at 145–46 (1888). 
 202.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 126. 
 203.  Id. 
2.KEELE_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018  10:38 AM 
1059 Copyright Infringement’s Blurred Lines 
 1091 
disgorgement simultaneously serves both deterrence and corrective 
justice. This view has been expressed by many courts and 
commentators,204 and it makes an appearance in the Third 
Restatement as well.205 In most cases, the deterrence rationale, which 
seeks to fashion incentives for bilateral negotiation rather than 
unilateral expropriation, results in remedies consistent with the 
corrective-justice rationale such that “there is little conflict between 
these goals.”206 
V. ALLOCATING OVERHEAD TOWARD THE 
 PROFITS OF INFRINGEMENT 
As discussed above, restitution scholars have proposed several 
distinct purposes in which to ground the remedy of disgorgement. 
Any view of the proper way to allocate overhead must be informed by 
the purposes to which the underlying disgorgement remedy is 
directed. The following sections assess the propriety of overhead 
allocation in light of the various purposes identified for disgorgement: 
deterrence, retribution, and corrective justice. I argue that both the 
deterrence view and the corrective-justice view (and, perhaps, the 
retributive view) suggest that an infringing defendant should be 
permitted to allocate overhead only when it can prove that, in the 
absence of infringement, it would have used the overhead to create 
additional noninfringing products. 
 
 204.  See, e.g., Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 804 (1869) (“The rule is 
founded in reason and justice. It compensates one party and punishes the other.”) (patent case); 
SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that 
disgorgement serves both a “deterrent purpose . . . [and] the goal of depriving a wrongdoer of 
unjust enrichment”); Dad’s Root Beer Co. v. Doc’s Beverages, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 121, 122 
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) (“Upon the facts, it would be unconscionable to permit defendants to retain 
any reward from their illegal enterprise. Nor should the law be such as to offer the slightest 
encouragement to those who perpetrate the kind of acts herein condemned.”); WEBB, supra 
note 189, at 188 (discussing “the good of ensuring wrongdoers don’t profit from their wrongs 
and/or deterring others who would seek to do the same”). 
 205.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 3 (“Restitution requires full disgorgement 
of profit by a conscious wrongdoer, not just because of the moral judgment implicit in the rule 
of this section, but because any lesser liability would provide an inadequate incentive to 
lawful  behavior.”). 
 206.  Roach, supra note 34, at 526 (“The case law . . . involves two inter-related goals: 
disgorging the defendant’s benefits and denying the defendant any economic incentive to 
infringe. Generally there is little conflict between these goals[,] . . . [and] there is little guidance 
in case law or law journal articles about the relative priority of either goal.”). 
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A. The Coercive View of Overhead Allocation 
Under the coercive view of disgorgement, the purpose of 
disgorgement is to create appropriate incentives for potential 
infringers to utilize the market to obtain property rights rather than 
expropriating those rights to themselves. This coercive view suggests 
that disgorgement is an improper remedy in cases of inadvertent 
infringement, such as subconscious copying. And as discussed in 
section III.A, the risk of disgorgement may prompt excess precautions 
on the part of those who risk inadvertent infringement.207 
One solution to the risk of excessive precautions is to distinguish 
between conscious and inadvertent wrongdoers, as is done in other 
disgorgement contexts. This distinction was central to the 
development of disgorgement law in equity—disgorgement of a 
wrongdoer’s profits was, in many cases, available only against 
conscious wrongdoers.208 This possible solution, however, has not 
been applied in the copyright context—disgorgement is a 
remedy  available to all copyright plaintiffs, even in cases of 
inadvertent  infringement.209 
But, even in copyright law, this culpability distinction could impact 
the way profits are measured—profits could be measured more 
stringently against willful infringers to ensure that they are not made 
better off by their infringement. This is the position of those who 
argue for a distinction between willful and nonwillful infringers when 
it comes to overhead allocation. They fear that willful or reckless 
infringement would be insufficiently deterred if infringers were 
permitted to allocate overhead toward the infringing products, 
thereby subsidizing their legitimate business through their infringing 
conduct.210 Thus, one commentator worried about the “paradox” 
created when individuals advocate the allocation of overhead while 
simultaneously arguing for “the goal of denying any incentive to the 
infringer.”211 Allocating overhead toward infringing profits leaves the 
 
 207.  See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 208.  LAYCOCK, supra note 73, at 525. One prominent exception was trust law. In trust 
law, a fiduciary’s breach of trust was subject to disgorgement even if it was inadvertent. See supra 
Part II. 
 209.  LAYCOCK, supra note 73, at 525. 
 210.  See generally Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 106–07 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing 
the subsidization concern). 
 211.  Roach, supra note 34, at 487. 
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infringer better off—even after the disgorgement—than it would have 
been in the absence of infringement. 
Consider this subsidization-by-infringement concern as illustrated 
in a practical example. Suppose that a book publisher publishes ninety-
nine legitimate books in a given year, costing $495,000 in variable 
expenses and generating revenues of $1 million. The publisher’s 
overhead is $100,000, which includes things such as salaried 
employees, depreciation of the equipment, and the lease of real 
property. The printer and other publishing equipment is in use only a 
fraction of its available time but otherwise sits idly the rest of the time. 
Now suppose that the publisher decides to publish an infringing book, 
and the book costs $5000 in variable expenses and generates gross 
revenues of $10,000. The profits from the book will be either $5000 
or $4000, depending on whether the defendant allocates a portion of 
its overhead to the infringing book.212 It is clear that the infringing 
book did not contribute to the overhead, although it is equally clear 
that the book could not have been published—and the profits could 
not have been made—without at least some of the overhead 
expenditures. If our goal is to take away from the wrongdoer all profits 
resulting from the wrongdoing, we should not permit the wrongdoer 
a credit for the overhead against the profits from the pirated book.213 
In the absence of infringement, the defendant would have made a 
profit of $405,000 that year.214 If we permit the defendant to allocate 
$1000 of overhead to the infringing book, the defendant’s profit 
increases to $406,000.215 In other words, if the defendant can allocate 
overhead toward the infringing book, the defendant is made better off 
as a result of infringement, and the noninfringement incentives 
are  suboptimal. 
 
 212.  There are multiple ways to allocate overhead. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
6, § 14.03. In this example, I employ the fractional share of the infringing product to all products 
to allocate overhead (1/100, or 1%), resulting in an allocation of $1000. 
 213.  If the publisher is an individual, he will not be able to charge his hours worked on 
the article. This is part of the bought-and-paid-for rule, which says that profits are reduced only 
by inputs that the defendant paid for. See Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1326, 
1331 (9th Cir. 1984). For employees, hourly wages would be a variable expense, while salaried 
employees would be fixed. (Nevertheless, some hourly wage-earners, such as receptionists, may 
fall under “overhead.”). 
 214.  $1 million (gross revenues) - $495,000 (variable expenses) - $100,000 (overhead). 
 215.  $1,010,000 (gross revenues) - $4000 (profits from infringement) - $500,000 
(variable expenses) - $100,000 (overhead). 
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Even in cases of willful infringement, however, the subsidization 
concern matters only if the infringer would not have produced some 
other additional product in the absence of infringement.216 If, on the 
other hand, the defendant would have produced additional 
noninfringing products, then the infringement does not leave the 
defendant better off than the position it would have occupied in the 
absence of infringement. In such a case, we can allocate overhead in 
determining the infringer’s profits without the concern that the 
infringer will have the incentive to subsidize its lawful production with 
infringing production. 
Suppose that, in the above example, the defendant can show that 
had it not published the infringing book, it would have published 
another book. The $1000 of overhead that contributed to publishing 
the infringing book instead would have been allocated to the 
noninfringing book. In that case, allowing overhead allocation does 
not render the defendant financially better off as a result of the 
infringement. In other words, if the defendant can show an 
opportunity cost of infringement217—a lost opportunity that resulted 
from its production of the infringing product—proportional overhead 
may be allocated to the infringing product without creating 
infringement-subsidization concerns. Likewise, if the defendant can 
show that it incurred a particular overhead expense because of the 
infringement, that overhead should be deducted from the award.218 
Thus, under a deterrence-based view of disgorgement, the 
propriety of overhead allocation turns on what the defendant would 
have done had it not infringed. We must play out the counterfactual 
in which the defendant did not engage in the infringement and then 
 
 216.  Margolis, supra note 48, at 1560 (recognizing that overhead should not be allocated 
in “instances in which excess capacity can be established”). 
 217.  Id. at 1545. 
 218.  Perhaps the starkest example would be an infringer who starts a business for the sole 
purpose of infringing. If the infringer makes only one product—the infringing product—then 
all of the infringer’s overhead should be allocated against the gross receipts from the infringing 
product. This measure is relatively uncontroversial; as Professor Laycock has said, “[A]t some 
point, the growth of the infringing part of the business will force an increase in overhead, and 
everyone agrees the court should take account of that.” LAYCOCK, supra note 73, at 538; see 
also Roach, supra note 34, at 497 (“There have been at least two cases in which the defendant’s 
entire operation infringed . . . . The court in both cases approved offset credit for fixed costs and 
other expenses that would not normally be offset except when all of the defendant’s 
operations  infringe.”). 
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determine whether the defendant would have produced additional 
noninfringing products but for the infringement. The objective of the 
counterfactual would be to determine whether, without the wrong, 
the defendant’s overhead would have been spread among its existing 
noninfringing production, or whether the defendant would have 
spread the overhead among additional products.219 In awarding 
disgorgement after conducting this analysis, we do not risk 
underdeterrence of the willful infringer, and there is no reason to 
assume that this approach would overdeter the productivity of those 
who risk inadvertent infringement. 
B. The Punitive View of Overhead Allocation 
If the sole purpose of disgorgement is to punish the wrongdoer (a 
purely retributive purpose and not an exemplary purpose designed to 
make an example out of the defendant to deter future wrongdoers), 
then there is no obvious reason to limit disgorgement to the 
wrongdoer’s profits. One wrongdoer may have little or no profits from 
willful infringement, whereas another equally culpable wrongdoer 
may have substantial profits from willful infringement. Assuming that 
the wrongdoers have a claim-right to the profits from the infringement 
(a dubious but necessary assumption since a punitive purpose would 
be furthered only if disgorgement takes away something that rightfully 
belongs to the wrongdoer), then one wrongdoer is punished far less 
than an equally culpable, though less successful, wrongdoer.220 
But to the extent that the punishment goal can correspond to a 
quantifiable measurement, the profits from infringement provide a 
measurable limit to the punitive nature of the infringement, thus 
providing a specific punitive measure to avoid the arbitrariness that is 
sometimes claimed to exist in unbounded, punitive tort awards.221 
Thus, Professor Weinrib has noted that “gain-based damages have 
been recommended as a way of introducing greater specificity into the 
punitive idea.”222 Disgorgement, it has been argued, “avoids the 
principal defect of punitive damages, which is the randomness in the 
 
 219.  Roach, supra note 22, at 1301–02. 
 220.  Perhaps this is akin to punishing attempted crimes less severely than completed 
crimes. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Decline of Cause, 76 Geo. L.J. 137, 139–40 (1987). 
 221.  See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008). 
 222.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 145 & n.48 (collecting sources). 
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amount of punitive awards.”223 If the purpose of disgorgement is to 
punish for wrongdoing, any adequate punishment should deprive the 
wrongdoer—at least a conscious wrongdoer—of all gains from the 
wrongdoing, including consequential gains. 
C. The Corrective-Justice View of Overhead Allocation 
1. Calculation of profits 
The corrective-justice view of disgorgement suggests that 
defendants should be made to disgorge any wrongful gains incurred 
through infringement. To understand how to calculate the wrongful 
gains of the defendant, it is helpful to examine the obverse situation—
the calculation of a tort-plaintiff ’s wrongful losses.224 In calculating a 
plaintiff’s rightful position in tort, we typically seek to determine the 
hypothetical outcome of the counterfactual in which the plaintiff 
never experienced the wrongful loss.225 In other words, we ask: 
“Where would the plaintiff be but for the defendant’s wrongdoing?” 
The answer includes not only the plaintiff ’s direct damages—property 
damage or bodily injury, for example—but it also includes any 
consequential losses flowing indirectly from the harm to the 
plaintiff,226 such as when bodily injury prevents a plaintiff from 
resuming her former occupation. 
The defendant’s rightful position in a disgorgement analysis 
should be subject to a similar analysis, taking into account both direct 
gains and consequential gains.227 Under this analysis, the question of 
whether to allocate overhead against the revenues of infringement 
turns on the defendant’s behavior in the counterfactual universe: we 
ask whether the defendant’s overhead would have been spread among 
additional products in the absence of infringement, as discussed above 
 
 223.  Gergen, supra note 6, at 830. 
 224.  For another work that compares wrongful losses in tort with wrongful gains in unjust 
enrichment, see WEBB, supra note 189, at 64–65. 
 225.  LAYCOCK, supra note 73, at 13. 
 226.  See Mark P. Gergen, Restitution as a Bridge over Troubled Contractual Waters, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 724 (2002) (discussing consequential damages and rightful position in 
contract); Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, 
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 27 (1994). 
 227.  See LAYCOCK, supra note 73, at 513. 
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with respect to the coercive view.228 The Sixth Circuit adroitly phrased 
it this way: 
 The ideal approach to resolving the conflicting considerations 
present here would be to ascertain whether without the infringement 
the defendant could have employed the facilities which were devoted 
to the infringing production in a manner which would have covered 
the fixed costs at issue. If no alternative use were available, the fixed 
costs sought to be allocated against the profits from the infringement 
would have been borne by the defendant’s existing non-infringing 
production, and a recovery of those costs would in effect reduce 
the  cost of his other production, resulting in a net gain from 
the  infringement.229 
If corrective justice is the basis of disgorgement, the goal will be 
to divest the wrongdoer of its “ill-gotten gains” without taking more 
than necessary to accomplish this purpose. If more than the wrongful 
gain is disgorged from the defendant, the wrongdoer would be 
punished (not the goal of corrective justice) and, if that money were 
given to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would receive an unjust windfall 
(also contrary to the aims of corrective justice). 
Because corrective justice seeks to divest the defendant of any 
gains resulting from infringement without imposing an additional 
penalty, the measure of disgorgement—and correspondingly, the 
method of allocating overhead—does not turn on the defendant’s 
culpability in infringement. Why, then, have several courts focused on 
the infringer’s willfulness in determining whether to allocate 
overhead? The confusion likely stems, in part, from the historical 
emphasis on the wrongdoer’s willfulness vel non in restitution 
more  generally.230 
The confusion also may be related to a likely correlation between 
the proper analysis and the willfulness analysis. Under the proper 
analysis, the infringer should be permitted to allocate overhead in 
some, but not all, cases (specifically, in those in which it can prove that 
it would have created a substitute noninfringing product in the 
 
 228.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 229.  Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1172 (6th Cir. 1980). One slight 
quibble with the Sixth Circuit’s suggested approach is that, instead of asking whether the 
defendant could have found additional revenue-generating uses for the fixed costs, the better 
question is whether the defendant would have found such uses. 
 230.  See LAYCOCK, supra note 73, at 525. 
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absence of infringement). A willfulness focus would likewise suggest 
that the infringer should be permitted to allocate overhead in some, 
but not all, cases (specifically, those in which the infringement was 
willful).231 And there may even be a general correlation between the 
two. It is reasonable to suspect that most willful infringers lack a 
profitable alternative product because, in most cases, infringers 
probably would not choose infringement if they had a profitable 
alternative.232 Inadvertent infringement, on the other hand, does not 
itself suggest that the infringer lacked potentially profitable alternative 
products. But willfulness is the wrong focus when it comes to 
overhead allocation. Instead, the proper focus is the defendant’s 
hypothetical position in the counterfactual in which the defendant did 
not infringe. 
2. Burdens of proof 
Although the Sixth Circuit recognized that the noninfringement 
counterfactual would be the “ideal approach,” the court rejected it as 
impractical, noting that “it will be difficult for the parties to show and 
the judge to determine what might have been.”233 It is true that the 
defendant cannot prove with absolute certainty what would have 
happened in the absence of infringement. But we regularly ask 
plaintiffs to prove to the factfinder “what might have been” in tort 
cases in which the plaintiff seeks to recover consequential losses, such 
as lost profits. In those cases, the plaintiff is tasked with proving the 
counterfactual universe to a “reasonable certainty.”234 It does not seem 
a monumental hurdle to task the defendant with convincing the 
factfinder that, but for the infringement, it would have used its 
overhead resources in some other revenue-generating fashion.235 
 
 231.  See Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 232.  See Gergen, supra note 6, at 847 (the thief’s “opportunity costs can be disregarded 
because we expect . . . people who turn to thievery do not have legitimate opportunities to 
make money”). 
 233.  Schnadig, 620 F.2d at 1172; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 51 
cmt. i (“The unusual difficulty of measurement in particular contexts explains why, in applying 
the disgorgement remedy, courts so often refer to burdens of proof and presumptions.”). 
 234.  See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264–65 (1946); Palmer 
v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544, 565 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Triple 
R Indus., Inc. v. Century Lubricating Oils, Inc., 912 F.2d 234, 237–38 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 235.  “[T]he defendant bears the burden of establishing the appropriate deductions from 
gross revenues to calculate net profits,” as well as demonstrating the portion of profits 
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This is consistent with the current general practice in copyright 
disgorgement cases, which places the burden of proof with respect to 
offsets against the gross revenues on the defendant.236 In a 
disgorgement case, the plaintiff must prove the gross revenues of 
infringement and the defendant must prove its allocation of 
expenses—that is, which costs (variable and fixed) should factor into 
the calculations. The defendant must also demonstrate a proper 
apportionment of profits by proving which profits, if any, are 
attributable to other inputs besides the infringement.237 This is the 
traditional breakdown for the burden of proof in disgorgement cases 
generally,238 and in the copyright context, the Copyright Act 
statutorily prescribes the burdens in this manner.239 Exactitude is not 
required,240 and the jury’s fact-finding regarding the counterfactual 
should be treated with deference.241 
In applying the general methodology to overhead allocation, then, 
there would be a presumption that the defendant would not have 
engaged in any other profitable activity in the counterfactual and, 
correspondingly, a presumption that overhead should not be allocated 
to the infringing product.242 The burden of proof with respect to 
 
attributable to inputs “other than the defendant’s wrongdoing.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra 
note 19, § 42 cmt. h. 
 236. Sullivan & Assocs., LLC v. Holladay, No. 3:09CV00079 JLH, 2010 WL 2605730, 
at *4 (E.D. Ark. June 25, 2010); Roach, supra note 34, at 516–17; Rounds, supra note 116, 
at 349. 
 237.  4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.03[D]. 
 238.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 51 cmt. i (describing this allocation of the 
burden of proof as the “traditional formula, inherited from trust accounting and enshrined in 
the Copyright Act”). 
 239.  17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012). 
 240.  Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 408 (1940) (“[W]hat is 
required is not mathematical exactness but only a reasonable approximation.”); see also In Design 
v. K–Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 564 (2d Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Fears 
v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 315 Fed. App’x. 333 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 241.  See Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 885 (2009) (noting, in a trademark 
cancellation suit, the deference due to lower court determinations regarding “hypothetical 
inquiries into what might have been”). 
 242.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19 § 42 cmt. h (citing id. § 51 cmt. i) 
(“Uncertainty resulting from difficulties of proof will properly be resolved against the 
wrongdoer, on standard equitable grounds.”). 
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allocable overhead will fall on the defendant.243 If the defendant can 
persuade the factfinder, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that it 
would have engaged in some other revenue-producing behavior in the 
absence of infringement, the defendant’s relevant overhead would be 
allocated to reduce the profits calculated from the infringement. But, 
as with the calculation of profits for copyright disgorgement more 
generally, the risk of uncertainty from a failure of proof falls on 
the  defendant.244 
3. Profits calculation in related contexts 
The counterfactual analysis, designed to place the defendant in the 
position it would have occupied in the absence of infringement, is 
consistent with the rules of overhead allocation in other cases. For 
example, the defendant in a disgorgement case may be considered an 
inverse of the lost-volume seller contemplated under Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code.245 A lost-volume seller’s damages from a 
breaching buyer are its expected profit, “including reasonable 
overhead,”246 from the missed sale, under the theory that, had the first 
buyer performed, the seller would have made two sales instead of only 
one.247 In calculating the lost-volume seller’s profits, Article 2 is clear 
that overhead costs are not allocated to reduce the profits.248 Only 
direct costs matter. The reasoning behind this disregard for overhead 
is clear—only by disregarding the plaintiff ’s overhead can we place the 
plaintiff in the position it would have occupied but for the breach 
because the plaintiff has already borne all of the overhead costs.249 
Reducing the seller’s profits by allocating overhead toward the lost 
 
 243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 51(5)(d) (“Residual risk of uncertainty in 
calculating net profit is assigned to the defendant.”); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, 
§ 14.03. 
 244.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
 245.  U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT. CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2017); see also Roach, supra note 34, at 540 (“Supporters of the full-absorption 
method must assume that an allocated portion of overhead is not a financial gain to the 
defendant. Yet these same courts hold that in contract claims, . . . allocation of fixed costs is a 
significant financial gain, and that it must be included in the remedy for the plaintiff.”). 
 246.  § 2-708(2). 
 247.  Vanderwerff Implement, Inc. v. McCance, 561 N.W.2d 24, 26 (S.D. 1997). 
 248.  § 2-708(2) (providing for “profit (including reasonable overhead)”). 
 249.  John R. Trentacosta, Damages in Breach of Contract Cases, 76 MICH. B.J. 1068, 
1071 (1997). 
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sale would result in the seller effectively double-paying that portion of 
the overhead and would thus leave the seller in a worse position than 
it would have occupied but for the wrong. 
A similar analysis holds true in calculating the plaintiff ’s damages 
in cases of tortious interference with contractual relations. When a 
defendant’s profits are disgorged because it tortiously interfered with 
a plaintiff’s contract with a third party, its profits are not offset by 
overhead.250 And in patent infringement cases in which the plaintiff 
seeks its own lost profits, courts rightly do not reduce damages by 
allocating the plaintiff ’s fixed costs because “fixed costs do not vary 
with increases in production.”251 As with the Article 2 cases, reducing 
the plaintiff ’s award because of the plaintiff ’s overhead requires the 
plaintiff to pay the overhead twice. 
Manufacturers Technologies v. Cams, Inc.252 offers an example of a 
case in which the court’s confusion regarding overhead allocation 
caused it to err in awarding both damages and restitution. In that case, 
some of the defendant’s infringing software competed with the 
copyright holder’s own software, whereas other of the defendant’s 
infringing software did not compete with any product of the 
plaintiff.253 Thus, the plaintiff copyright holder sought two separate 
awards: one for lost profits from the defendant’s sale of infringing 
software that competed with the plaintiff’s product, and the other for 
disgorgement of the defendant’s sales that did not compete with the 
plaintiff’s product.254 The court reduced the plaintiff ’s award of lost 
profits from the competing products by allocating the plaintiff ’s 
overhead (expenditures on advertising, promotion, and selling) 
toward those profits, even though the uncontroverted evidence 
showed that the plaintiff ’s overhead would not have increased if it, 
rather than the defendant, had made the sales at issue.255 This, of 
 
 250.  Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 757 F.2d 1401, 1412 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 251.  Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., Nos. N–75–51 (EBB), B–80–281 (EBB), 
1989 WL 85643, at *9 (D. Conn. June 27, 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 939 F.2d 
1540 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 252.  Mfrs. Techs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 75, 82–83 (D. Conn. 1989). 
 253.  Id. at 82–84. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Id. at 82–83. The cases the court cited to support this conclusion—Sygma Photo 
News, Inc. v. High Soc’y Magazine, 778 F.2d 89, 93–94 (2d Cir. 1985); Wilkie v. Santly Bros., 
Inc., 139 F.2d 264, 265 (2d Cir. 1943); and Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 
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course, left the plaintiff short of its rightful position with respect to 
the competing sales—allocating the plaintiff ’s already-incurred 
overhead toward the plaintiff ’s lost profits damages essentially forced 
the plaintiff to incur those same expenses twice, even though it would 
have incurred them only once if it had made all of the sales 
in question.256 
Even though the court allocated overhead against the plaintiff ’s 
lost profits damages, the court refused to allocate overhead in 
disgorging the defendant’s profits from sales the defendant made in 
markets in which the plaintiff did not compete because the defendant’s 
infringement was willful.257 In focusing exclusively on the defendant’s 
willfulness, the court neglected to consider the noninfringement 
counterfactual and, consequently, may have left the defendant short 
of its “rightful position” with respect to those sales. Such confusion 
can be avoided if courts consider the purpose underlying 
disgorgement and tailor the remedy accordingly. 
4. The plaintiff’s entitlement to the profits 
The analysis so far suggests how to properly calculate the wrongful 
gains from a defendant’s infringement, but it does not speak to the 
plaintiff’s entitlement to those gains. Neither the coercive view nor 
the punitive view offer persuasive accounts for the plaintiff ’s receipt of 
disgorgement proceeds;258 if disgorgement is purely coercive or 
punitive, it should not matter who receives the defendant’s disgorged 
profits. Unlike the coercive and punitive views, however, the 
corrective-justice conception of disgorgement does not focus on the 
 
45, 54 (2d Cir. 1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940)—all involved the allocation of the defendant’s 
overhead in calculating disgorgement. 
 256.  See Hamil Am., Inc. v. SGS Studio, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2513(JSM), 1998 WL 19991, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 
92 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that lost sales damages should be calculated by lost gross revenues 
minus incremental costs because “[o]nce a copyright holder has sufficient sales so that its 
income  is sufficient to cover all of its costs, including overhead, additional sales will increase its 
profits to the extent that the sales proceeds exceed the costs of goods sold and any other 
incremental  expenses”). 
 257.  Mfrs. Techs., 728 F. Supp. at 84. 
 258.  A coercive view or a punitive view might suggest that the plaintiff receives the profits 
only because it is in the best position to learn of the infringement, so that providing this remedy 
gives the plaintiff the necessary incentive to sue. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 223 (9th ed. 2014). 
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defendant’s rightful position to the exclusion of the plaintiff. The goal 
of corrective justice is not merely to eliminate the defendant’s profits 
from the wrongdoing but to undo the wrong done by the defendant 
to the plaintiff.259 
Likewise, an exclusively defendant-focused view of disgorgement 
cases offers no account of why the plaintiff, rather than some third 
party, receives the profits disgorged from the defendant. Indeed, 
under such a view, the plaintiff is merely “the ‘accidental beneficiary’ 
of a disgorgement order intended . . . to prevent unjust 
enrichment.”260 For that matter, if the defendant’s but-for-the-wrong 
position is the sole measure of the remedy, there is no reason to limit 
the counterfactual to the allocation of overhead—it is at least 
conceivable that a situation would arise in which the defendant could 
convince the jury that it would have been more profitable if it had not 
infringed. With an exclusively defendant-focused view of 
disgorgement liability, the defendant in such a case could argue that 
its liability should be reduced or even completely eliminated based on 
the potential profit that it might have made from its noninfringing 
alternative.261 But the relational component of the corrective-justice 
inquiry—and the plaintiff ’s corresponding moral claim to the recovery 
of profits derived from its property—forestalls such an argument by 
focusing on the interrelatedness of the defendant’s wrongdoing and 
the plaintiff ’s claim-rights. 
Unless the plaintiff has a moral claim to the recovery of the 
defendant’s profits,262 disgorgement will have failed at its oft-stated 
goal of ensuring that neither party is unjustly enriched263—the plaintiff 
would be unjustly enriched if it received proceeds to which it was not 
morally entitled. And, if the plaintiff has no moral claim to the money, 
then the argument that the award is punitive gains significant traction, 
raising several practical concerns about punitive remedies, including 
 
 259.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 17 (the remedy “consists in simultaneously removing 
the defendant’s excess and making good the plaintiff’s deficiency”). 
 260.  Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 417 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
 261.  See Gergen, supra note 6, at 846 (“The upshot is that if you believe disgorgement 
generally is limited to the gain attributable to a wrong, then you ought to give a wrongdoer 
credit for overhead, fixed costs, and opportunity costs more generally . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 262.  See Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he owner is allowed 
to capture the additional profit even though it does not represent a loss to him.”). 
 263.  See supra notes 193–201 and accompanying text. 
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due process limitations on punitive awards264 and escheatment of 
portions of the award to the state in certain jurisdictions.265 Thus, we 
must ask whether the plaintiff has a moral claim to the disgorged sums. 
Under corrective justice, at least, the answer is affirmative. 
We can consider the corrective-justice approach—the only 
approach that satisfactorily explains the plaintiff’s entitlement to the 
disgorgement proceeds—in part by briefly examining corrective-
justice accounts of the tort system: Why should the defendant be 
responsible for making the tort plaintiff whole when there are other 
potential systems, such as placing liability on the government or on 
third-party cost-spreaders like insurers?266  
Professor Coleman takes up this issue. He initially concludes that 
although corrective justice requires compensation to the plaintiff, it 
cannot, standing alone, justify imposing liability on the tortfeasor.267 
He does, however, articulate one possible reason to impose liability on 
the wrongdoer: “[C]laim rights impose correlative duties [such that] 
the victim’s right, which is grounded in corrective justice, imposes a 
correlative duty to repair on his injurer.”268 Professor Weinrib largely 
agrees with this suggestion, concluding that the duty to abstain from 
invading property rights and the duty to repair prior invasions of 
property rights are different manifestations of the same duty rather 
than two distinct and separately arising duties.269 Professors Epstein 
and Thomson, however, suggest a different basis for imposing 
wrongdoer liability, arguing that the defendant’s causation of the 
 
 264.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 265.  See 2 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 21:18 (2d ed. 2016) (collecting statutes in which some portion of punitive awards 
belongs to the state). It is an interesting question whether state provisions requiring portions of 
punitive awards to be paid to the state are preempted by federal copyright law given the field 
preemption that typically applies in this area. See Berklee Coll. of Music, Inc. v. Music Indus. 
Educators, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 204, 212 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 266. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, supra note 183, at 426. 
 267. Id. at 425–27; see also id. at 428–29 n.16. Coleman acknowledged that prudential 
considerations outside of corrective justice may justify tortfeasor liability. Id. He later recanted 
the view that corrective justice could not explain the imposition of liability on the tortfeasor. See 
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 183, at 403–04 & n.7, 432–35. Coleman would 
later describe gain-based damages as relational between the wrongdoer and the plaintiff, but he 
would term these damages restitutionary justice instead of corrective justice. Id. at 371. 
 268.  Id. at 426. Coleman initially rejected this explanation, see id., but later came to agree 
with it, at least in part, id. at 318–19. 
 269.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 90–91. 
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plaintiff’s injury gives the plaintiff a moral claim to the 
defendant’s  liability.270 
Regardless of the basis, almost all corrective-justice accounts— 
including Professor Coleman’s later views—recognize that the tort 
defendant is morally obligated to restore the plaintiff ’s losses.271 The 
gain-based corollary to this is that the disgorgement plaintiff has a 
moral claim to the defendant’s profits.272 This comports with our 
moral intuitions—most of us would agree that the plaintiff has a 
superior claim to the proceeds of disgorgement than does a passerby 
on the street. “From the perspective of corrective justice, gain-based 
damages for proprietary wrongs are an entitlement of the proprietor, 
and not merely a mechanism for protecting the integrity of property 
as a facilitative institution.”273 
That the positive law follows this “plaintiff-entitled” approach to 
disgorgement is evidenced by the law’s insistence on a causal 
connection between the defendant’s disgorged gain and the invasion 
of the plaintiff ’s rights.274 A plaintiff cannot recover a defendant’s 
profits that are not attributable to the use of the plaintiff ’s property—
this is true even if the profits were the result of the defendant’s 
wrongful use of someone else’s property. The only claims the plaintiff 
holds are for profits from the exploitation of the plaintiff’s copyrights. 
Nor does disgorgement permit the plaintiff to recover profits 
unrelated to the wrongdoing, no matter how egregious the 
defendant’s misdeeds. The plaintiff is not free to disgorge all the 
defendant’s profits for the past year if the infringing product was only 
one of many profitable products for the defendant. As Judge Posner—
himself no corrective-justice jurisprude—has said, “If General Motors 
were to steal your copyright and put it in a sales brochure, you could 
not just put a copy of General Motors’s corporate income tax return 
 
 270.  Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, supra note 183, at 430–32 
(chronicling the Epstein position); Thomson, supra note 220, at 148 & n.16. 
 271.  See generally COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 183, at 318–19. 
 272.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 119. 
 273.  Id. at 126. 
 274.  SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Since 
disgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment, the court may exercise its equitable 
power only over property causally related to the wrongdoing. The remedy may well be a key to 
the SEC’s efforts to deter others from violating the securities laws, but disgorgement may not 
be used punitively.”). 
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in the record and rest your case for an award of infringer’s profits.”275 
The disgorgement remedy requires a causal connection between 
the  income received and the illicit conduct related to the 
plaintiff’s  copyright.276 
Because, as the positive law recognizes, the defendant and plaintiff 
are intimately connected as the doer and sufferer of the same injustice, 
Professor Weinrib asserts that “gain-based damages should be 
available when the defendant’s gain is the materialization of a 
favorable possibility—the opportunity to gain—that rightfully 
belonged to the plaintiff.”277 Professor Weinrib’s assertion pairs well 
with others who have taken similar positions. For example, Sharpe and 
Waddams argue that disgorgement compensates plaintiffs for their 
“loss of opportunity to bargain” with the defendant.278 Professor 
Webb rejects this compensatory view,279 but his corrective-justice 
account280 suggests that the ownership of a copyright entails a right to 
 
 275.  Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 276.  SEC v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 277.  WEINRIB, supra note 105, at 125. Professor Weinrib’s view, in which the defendant’s 
gains and the plaintiff’s losses always correspond, suggests that disgorgement may be viewed as 
compensatory, and it suggests another potential counterfactual: the plaintiff’s hypothetical profit 
if the plaintiff had decided to exploit its copyright as the defendant did. In that case, the relevant 
question becomes whether the plaintiff would have had to incur the costs at issue in order to 
exploit its copyright as the infringer did. 
 278.  Robert J. Sharpe & S.M. Waddams, Damages for Lost Opportunity to Bargain, 2 
OXFORD J.L. STUD. 290, 296 (1982). Sharpe and Waddams recognize that this “lost 
opportunity” theory “allows the plaintiff the benefit of a presumption that he would have 
demanded the greatest sum that the defendant would rationally have paid.” Id. at 297. In other 
intellectual property contexts, this form of damages takes the form of a hypothetical negotiation, 
in which the measure of damages is the outcome of a hypothetical negotiation between the 
parties. See Layne S. Keele, Res“Q”ing Patent Infringement Damages After ResQNet: The 
Dangers of Litigation Licenses as Evidence of a Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
181, 183 (2012). In the hypothetical negotiation with parties of equal bargaining power, the 
parties would be expected to reach an agreement in the middle of the overlap of their bargaining 
ranges. Under the lost opportunity theory, the award is not only “the greatest sum that the 
defendant would rationally have paid,” but it is slightly greater since disgorgement seeks to annul 
all gains of the defendant, and the rational profit maximizer would not be expected to act for no 
gain. See also Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (recognizing 
that “some of the ‘windfall’ may actually be profit that the owner would have obtained from 
licensing his copyright to the infringer had the infringer sought a license”). 
 279.  See WEBB, supra note 189, at 197; see also id. at 176–78. 
 280.  See id. at 236 (“There is no difficulty in describing claims in unjust enrichment as 
claims of corrective justice.”). 
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“all wealth generated through its exploitation.”281 And the Supreme 
Court said long ago that the defendant’s profits “are in fact a 
compensation for the injury the [plaintiff] has sustained from the 
invasion of his right. They are the measure of his damages.”282 The 
goal of disgorgement, then, is not merely to take what the defendant 
gained from the wrongful alienation of the plaintiff ’s property but also 
to give it to the plaintiff as the rightful owner. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The allocation of overhead in copyright disgorgement cases has 
vexed courts for over half a century.283 The confusion stems from an 
understandable but misplaced focus on the culpability of the 
infringer—specifically, whether the infringement was willful. This 
focus may be a function of the coercive or punitive views of 
disgorgement (although, even under the coercive view, the willfulness 
focus is generally unnecessary under existing copyright law), or it may 
be a function of restitution’s historical concerns with the wrongdoer’s 
state of mind in certain cases. But, in any event, willfulness does not 
matter under the Copyright Act or under historical disgorgement 
principles, which treat infringers as trustees over the gains resulting 
from their handling of another’s property. 
This Article has argued that the most logical view of disgorgement 
under the Copyright Act is a corrective-justice rationale under which 
neither party should have what rightfully belongs to the other.284 The 
wrongdoer who produces and sells some product incorporating the 
copyright holder’s property generates value from the intangible 
property and holds a claim in counter-restitution for its expenses 
incurred in generating the profit, just as a defaulting trustee has a claim 
for expenses spent to benefit the trust. Overhead allocation, then, 
becomes a question of not only whether the wrongdoer can 
legitimately claim that the overhead enhanced the copyright value, but 
 
 281.  Id. at 191. According to Webb, the rightful owner is generally entitled to value 
generated by the defendant’s exchange of the owner’s property, but not necessarily value 
generated by the use of the owner’s property. Id. at 187–88, 191. A profitable copyright 
infringement—and thus, one subject to disgorgement of profits—would presumably involve an 
“exchange” of the protected work of authorship for money. 
 282.  Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 620, 653 (1871). 
 283.  See supra Part I. 
 284.  See supra Parts III–IV. 
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also whether the overhead represents an actual expense attributable to 
exploitation of the copyright. This does not require conforming to an 
accounting fiction,285 but instead requires playing out a counterfactual 
to determine whether, in the absence of infringement, the infringer 
would have spread that part of its overhead among additional 
products. If so, this opportunity cost represents an attributable 
expense, and the infringer should be permitted to allocate the 
overhead. If not, no allocation should be permitted. This approach 
furthers the general aims of disgorgement within the existing 
construct of the Copyright Act, and it gives the copyright holder 
“every dollar of advantage realized by the infringer from the 
infringement and no more.”286 
 
 
 285.  See Roach, supra note 22, at 1285; see also Blurred Lines Case, supra note 7, ECF No. 
351, at 52–54. 
 286.  Levin Bros. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1934) (patent 
infringement case). 
